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I. INTRODUCTION 
When most authors write about the professional discipline of 
lawyers, they focus on ultimate outcomes and the procedures that 
produce them.  What misconduct did the lawyer commit?  What sanction 
was imposed?  What mitigating and aggravating factors influenced the 
ultimate sanction?  Were the proceedings sufficiently fair?  Were they 
sufficiently open? 
But much of the action, from the accused lawyer’s perspective, can 
happen without a final determination being reached in a formal 
disciplinary proceeding.  Lawyers often have their right to practice 
curtailed in very different ways.  These go by many names — 
administrative suspension, interim suspension, temporary suspension, 
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summary suspension, automatic suspension, emergency suspension — 
but they all share a common temporary loss of the right to practice 
imposed with something less than a full disciplinary hearing. 
States authorize the use of administrative and interim suspensions 
in a variety of settings.  They can be imposed to: 
• Secure adherence to law-licensing requirements;1 
• Induce compliance with societal obligations imposed 
outside the disciplinary process;2 
• Shelter the public from lawyers who have been found by 
others to have engaged in professional misconduct or 
serious criminal activity;3 
• Compel cooperation in the disciplinary process;4 and 
• Protect the public when continued practice by a lawyer 
poses a substantial threat of serious harm.5 
Suspending a lawyer from practice, even for a limited period of 
time, however, can have substantial negative consequences for the 
lawyer, the lawyer’s clients, third-parties, and the legal system.6  In this 
article, I explore the differing rationales underlying each of these types 
of suspension and whether, in each instance, suspension is the 
appropriate tool to protect those interests, or whether less drastic 
remedies would suffice.  Upon balancing the legitimate interests 
furthered by such suspensions against the substantial costs they impose, 
I argue for tempering those consequences in certain settings, such as 
pure administrative suspensions, and for employing less disruptive 
sanctions wherever possible. 
II. ADMINISTRATIVE SUSPENSIONS 
Sometimes one’s right to practice is suspended for failure to follow 
administrative requirements imposed by the state supreme court or the 
bar as conditions for maintaining one’s law license.7  In fact, the 
 1.  See infra Part II. 
 2.  See infra Part III. 
 3.  See infra Part IV. 
 4.  See infra Part V. 
 5.  See infra Part VI. 
 6.  See infra text accompanying notes 20-67, 71, 93-100, 107-10, 181-84. 
 7.  Many states recognize a distinction between administrative and disciplinary suspensions.  
See, e.g., Sitcov v. D.C. Bar, 885 A.2d 289, 297–98 (D.C. 2005); In re Holmberg, 135 P.3d 1196, 
1200 n.2 (Kan. 2006) (noting hearing panel’s analysis that rule providing that violation of a 
suspension order constitutes grounds for disbarment applies only to disciplinary suspensions not 
administrative suspensions); In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, 718 n.5 (Utah 2004) (collecting 
examples).  They often are administered by different bodies.  See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. V, VI 
 
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss1/5
ARTICLE 5 GREENBAUM MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2014  11:47 AM 
2014] ADMINISTRATIVE AND INTERIM SUSPENSIONS 67 
imposition of administrative suspensions is quite common.8  This section 
examines the consequences of these suspensions, including how they 
affect the lawyer, the lawyer’s clients, and the system, and discusses the 
nullity rule, which nullifies work done by a lawyer who continues to 
practice while under administrative suspension.  The question in this 
area is whether such suspensions are justified given the substantial 
consequences they impose. I conclude that intentional and inadvertent 
violations of administrative requirements should be treated differently, 
and X (noting different entities are responsible for pursuing suspensions for disciplinary offenses, 
failure to register, and failure to comply with CLE requirements); In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d at 
718–23 (noting that the Bar was authorized to enter administrative suspensions for failure to pay bar 
dues, but disciplinary authorities were the body to pursue discipline for practicing while under the 
suspension).  Further, the consequences of such a suspension may be less severe.  For example, in 
the District of Columbia, unlike disciplinary suspensions, a lawyer under administrative suspension 
is under no duty to notify clients and adverse parties of the suspension.  Sitcov, 885 A.2d at 298; cf. 
In re Charges of Unprofessional Conduct in Panel Case No. 23236, 728 N.W.2d 254, 258 (Minn. 
2007) (distinguishing suspension for failure to comply with CLE requirements, for which no duty to 
notify clients is imposed, with other suspensions which impose the duty).  But see PA. R. DISCIPL. 
ENF. 217 (requiring notice to clients and others where administrative suspensions are entered); In re 
Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495, at *6 (Cal. State Bar Ct. Review Dep’t 
June 19, 2012) (finding a violation of the duty of communication for failing to tell clients of 
administrative suspension for failure to pay annual bar fees).  Suspended lawyers can have the 
suspension automatically lifted, without more, simply by meeting the relevant requirement.  See 
infra note 18.  Since the suspension is only administrative, the lawyer will maintain an unblemished 
disciplinary record in some jurisdictions.  Sitcov, 885 A.2d at 298.  In Ohio, an administrative 
suspension is entered along with disciplinary sanctions on the Ohio Supreme Court’s website listing 
of lawyers.  See Attorney Discipline and Sanction History, THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO & THE 
OHIO JUDICIAL SYSTEM, http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttySvcs/AttyReg/
Public_AttorneyDiscTrans.asp (last visited May 20, 2013).  Thus the distinction may be lost on 
prospective clients who check that site. 
 8.  The number of such suspensions appears staggering.  For example, in a 2005 decision, 
counsel for the District of Columbia Board of Governors indicated that “approximately 2,200 
members of the Bar are placed on administrative suspension each year.” Sitcov, 885 A.2d at 301 
n.21.  In Ohio, the number of those suspended for failure to comply with the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
registration requirements varies widely across the years.  In 2009 there were 233.  In re Att’y 
Registration Suspension, 915 N.E.2d 1256 (Ohio 2009).  In contrast, in 2011 there were only 67.  In 
re Att’y Registration Suspension, 957 N.E.2d 302 (Ohio 2011).  In Illinois, the number of lawyers 
suspended for failure to register has been more than 1,000 a year from 2009 to 2012.  ILLINOIS 
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2012, at 10 
[hereinafter ILLINOIS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 2012].  Less dramatic numbers are seen for failure to 
comply with CLE requirements.  In Ohio, 57 such suspensions were entered in 2011 and 74 in 2012.  
E-mail from Bret Crow, Ohio Supreme Court Public Information Officer, to Marissa Black (May 
28, 2013, 9:21 EST) (on file with author).  In Illinois, the numbers were 153 and 93.  ILLINOIS, 
ANNUAL REPORT OF 2012, at 10.  In Tennessee, 145 lawyers received such suspensions in both 
2011 and 2012.  See Order of Summary Suspension for Failure to Comply with the Rule for 
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (Tenn. Aug. 31, 2012), available at 
http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/clesuspend_083112.pdf; Order of Summary Suspension for 
Failure to Comply with the Rule for Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (Tenn., Aug. 31, 
2011), available at http://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/clesuspend_083111.pdf. 
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that the nullity rule should only apply where the client knows of the 
suspension and continues to rely on the suspended lawyer’s services, and 
that alternative remedies to secure compliance with administrative 
requirements should be considered. 
Depending on the state, failure to comply with registration 
requirements,9 to pay bar dues in a unified-bar jurisdiction,10 to meet 
CLE obligations,11 to provide annually required trust account 
information,12 or to comply with other administrative requirements13 can 
lead to automatic license suspension until the deficiency is cured.14  
 9.  See, e.g., COLO. ST. R.C.P. 277(4)(a); OHIO GOV. BAR R. VI § (6)(B); PA. R. DISCIPL. 
ENF. 219(f); R.I. SUP. CT. R., art. IV, R. 1(c). 
 10.  See, e.g., R. GOV’G D.C. BAR II § 6; TEX. STATE BAR R. art. III § 5; cf. ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 
62(a)(2) (suspension “may” be entered); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 10.03(6) (lawyer “may be suspended”); 
see also In re Montgomery, 242 P.3d 528 (Okla. 2010) (noting that lawyer was “stricken from the 
roll of attorneys of the Oklahoma Bar Association for nonpayment of dues and noncompliance with 
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education” and therefore was not authorized to practice law). 
 11.  See, e.g., ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 62(a)(3) & (5) (failure to complete mandatory CLE or the 
new Admittee Professionalism course “may” lead to suspension); TEX. STATE BAR R. Art. XII § 
8(E) (failure to complete CLE requirements results in automatic suspension from the practice of 
law); VA. SUP. CT. R. § IV ¶ (17)(D) (failure to certify compliance with mandatory CLE “shall 
cause suspension”).  In re Smith, 939 P.2d 422 (Ariz. 1997); In re Continuing Educ. Requirements, 
927 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 2010); In re McGraw, 217 P.3d 25 (Kan. 2009); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 188 
S.W.3d 426, 426–27 (Ky. 2006); Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Kammerer, 14 S.W.3d 919 (Ky. 2000); In re 
Rothenberg, 676 N.W.2d 283 (Minn. 2004); In re Montgomery, 242 P.3d at 528 (noting that 
“Petitioner was stricken from the roll of attorneys of the Oklahoma Bar Association for nonpayment 
of dues and noncompliance with Mandatory Continuing Legal Education”); In re Wyllie, 957 P.2d 
1222 (Or. 1998); In re Hankin, 804 P.2d 30 (Wash. 1991); Polk v. Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
732 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 2007).  See generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Discipline of Attorney for 
Failure to Comply with Continuing Legal Education Requirements, 96 A.L.R.5th 23 (2002 & Cum. 
Supp.).  Where noncompliance is accompanied by lies or misrepresentations about one’s CLE 
compliance, more stringent disciplinary penalties may be imposed.  See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. § VI ¶ 
(17)(D) (explicitly recognizing this distinction).  Zitter, supra, at § 4[b]. 
 12.  See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 62(a)(4); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:1.15(i)(4). 
 13.  See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 9.200 (2012) (providing for administrative suspension for 
failure to pay assessments to the state’s professional liability fund).  Though this law was recently 
amended by the Oregon legislature, the basis for administrative suspension was not altered.  H.B. 
2565, 77th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2013). 
 14.  Mandatory Continuing Legal Education, [Manual] LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT 
(ABA/BNA) 21:3001 (June 25, 2008). 
A lawyer who does not meet compulsory continuing legal education requirements and 
has not received some kind of extension or exemption is ineligible to practice.  Like the 
lawyer who neglects to file a required certificate of insurance, or who fails to pay bar 
dues in a unified-bar jurisdiction, the lawyer is subject to automatic administrative sus-
pension. 
Depending on the circumstances, some states also treat this conduct as a separate disciplinary 
offense warranting additional sanction.  See, e.g., In re Horrell, 819 N.Y.S.2d 773, 775 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2006) (imposing an interim suspension for failure to register and then later imposing an 
additional sanction finding the failure violated the rules of professional conduct as conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice); see also In re McDonald, 775 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 2001) 
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Although admittedly a ham-handed tool, suspensions are justified in this 
setting as a tool of last resort.15  Typically, the lawyer has been sent 
numerous notices of a need to comply with the requirement.16  A lesser 
penalty to induce compliance, such as charging a late fee, also has been 
threatened.17  Further, if an administrative suspension is entered, it 
usually will be lifted upon compliance with the requirement that led to 
the suspension in the first place.18  Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
officials in charge of administering these requirements, or imposing 
sanctions for failure to comply, often scan the list of noncomplying 
lawyers and make personal pleas to those they know to cure their 
delinquencies.19 
As with any suspension from practice, however, the imposition of 
an administrative suspension has potential consequences for the lawyer 
involved, the lawyer’s clients, and third parties.  For the lawyer, 
adherence to the suspension interrupts his ability to practice.  If the 
(treating failure to comply with CLE requirements as a disciplinary violation for knowingly 
disobeying the rules of a tribunal; here warranting a public reprimand when coupled with 
noncooperation). 
 15.  An immediate suspension for failure to comply with administrative requirements may 
also have a protection of the public rationale as the failure suggests that the lawyer’s practice may 
be out of control.  See, e.g., Zitter, supra note 11, at 37 (noting that “inattention to CLE 
requirements may presage a finding of inattention to other ethical and disciplinary rules” such as 
neglect and failure to communicate with clients).  But see In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225, 1229 
(D.C. 1988) (noting that “nonpayment of bar dues says little about . . . fitness to practice”). 
 16.  See, e.g., In re Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495, *1 (noting 
that Ms. Seltzer had been sent notice her membership fees were due, an e-mail reminder, a 
delinquency notice, and a notice of suspension that could be cured, before binding suspension was 
entered). 
 17.  See, e.g., R. GOV’G D.C. BAR II § 6 (providing for notification of a late charge for failure 
to pay bar membership fees, with suspension available only if charges and fees due are not timely 
paid). 
 18.  Sitcov v. D.C. Bar, 885 A.2d 289, 298 (D.C. 2005); In re Steinbach, 427 So.  2d 733, 734 
(Fla. 1983) (under rules then in force, reinstatement was automatic even where, as here, the lawyer 
had not paid bar dues in Florida for years and there was a legitimate concern that he had not kept up 
with changes in Florida law); see also COLO. R. CIV. P. 260.6(13) (providing for reinstatement from 
suspension for failure to meet mandatory CLE requirements upon showing of compliance and 
payment of costs).  But see State ex rel. Robeson v. Or. State Bar, 632 P.2d 1255, 1259–60 (Or. 
1981) (noting respondent’s contention that in many jurisdictions reinstatement from administrative 
suspensions is possible simply by coming into compliance with the obligation violated, but finding 
that a provision requiring more, as was the case with the Oregon provision in question, was not 
improper); Pennsylvania v. Grant, 992 A.2d 152, 160 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (noting that while a 
suspension for failure to pay bar dues may be lifted upon payment, suspension for failure to 
complete required CLE requires a “formal order of our Supreme Court after a showing that [the 
attorney] had ‘the moral qualifications, competency and learning in the law required for admission 
to practice in the Commonwealth’”). 
 19.  Confidential Posting, Association of Professional Responsibility Lawyers Listserv (Oct. 
21, 2005) (on file with author). 
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suspension is treated as “a prior disciplinary offense,” it will be 
considered as an aggravating factor should subsequent disciplinary 
proceedings arise20 or at least eliminate “absence of disciplinary 
record” as a mitigating factor.21 
Yet, continuing to practice while under an administrative 
suspension is the unauthorized practice of law,22 which can have civil,23 
 20.  See Am. Bar Ass’n, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER DISCIPLINE 9.22(a) (1992).  
Exactly which administrative suspensions fall in that category is unclear.  For example, in Ohio, 
failure to maintain one’s registration with the state supreme court is a disciplinary offense.  See, e.g., 
Mahoning Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Kish, 961 N.E. 2d 172, 177 (Ohio 2012) (treating registration 
suspension as a prior disciplinary offense, an aggravating factor, even though that suspension was 
“brief[]”); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n v. Brown, 956 N.E.2d 296, 300 n.1 (Ohio 2011) (treating 
prior registration suspension as an aggravating factor).  Nevertheless, “[a] registration suspension 
may not weigh heavily against a respondent when the prior discipline consists only of a registration 
suspension.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony, __ N.E. 2d __, ¶ 11 (Ohio 2014).  In contrast, 
failure to meet compulsory CLE requirements is not.  See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. X § 5(c); 
Trumbull Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Ohlin, 977 N.E.2d 640, 641 n.1 (Ohio 2012) (finding that a CLE 
suspension “shall not be considered in the imposition of a sanction for attorney misconduct”); 
Disciplinary Counsel v.  Murraine, 958 N.E.2d 942, 943 n.2 (Ohio 2011) (noting that the Governing 
Bar Rule “prohibits consideration of an attorney’s failure to comply with CLE requirements in the 
imposition of a [disciplinary] sanction”).  Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court sometimes 
considers the latter as well.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Alexander, 977 N.E.2d 633, 635 
(Ohio 2012) (treating as one aggravating factor both failure to pay registration fee on a timely basis 
and failure to pay a fine for not completing CLE requirements). 
 21.  STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER DISCIPLINE, supra note 20, at 9.32(a). 
 22.  In re Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495 (Cal. State Bar Ct. 
Review Dep’t June 19, 2012); In re Holmberg, 135 P.3d 1196 (Kan. 2006); In re Hanson, No. 
57545, 2012 WL 436740 (Nev. Feb. 9, 2012); Disciplinary Counsel v. Meehan, 975 N.E.2d 972, 
976 (Ohio 2012); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. O’Neal, 852 P.2d 713 (Okla. 1993); Hill v.  State, 
393 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965); In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, 720–23 (Utah 2004).  
But cf. State v. Lentz, 844 So. 2d 837, 842 (La. 2003) (deciding that continued practice while under 
suspension for failure to meet CLE requirements is the unauthorized practice of law but noting that 
“[t]he unauthorized practice of law during a period of suspension imposed by this court is a far more 
serious infraction than similar conduct during a period of ineligibility imposed as a result of the 
failure to comply with mandatory CLE,” here in the context of whether such practice constitutes the 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
  The courts are split over whether actual notice of the suspension is required before 
continued practice will be seen as the unauthorized practice of law.  Compare State ex rel. Okla. Bar 
Ass’n v. Whitworth, 183 P.3d 984, 992 (Okla. 2008) (dismissing charge that lawyer committed the 
unauthorized practice of law by practicing while under suspension because it was plausible that 
lawyer lacked notice of his suspension), and In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d at 726 n.13 (“[W]hen 
seeking disciplinary sanctions against an attorney for practicing law while administratively 
suspended, it is the Bar’s burden to establish that the respondent attorney received actual notice of 
the suspension and continued to practice law with knowledge of that suspension.”), with Seltzer, 
2012 WL 5406495, at *4-5 (concluding that the lawyer engaged in the unauthorized practice of law 
for practicing while under suspension for failure to pay bar dues even though lawyer was unaware 
of failure to pay), and Meehan, 975 N.E.2d at 976 (imposing a two year stayed suspension for 
continuing to practice while under administrative suspension for failure to renew his registration 
even though he immediately ceased practice upon learning of his suspension).  Cf. Jones v. Jones, 
635 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (treating as a nullity filing of an appeal where it was filed 
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criminal24 and disciplinary consequences.25  Arguably, clients could 
contest fees “earned” for services while under administrative suspension 
as against public policy.26  It might also lead to a contempt of court 
finding for violating the terms of the suspension.27 
A case that well illustrates the collateral impact an administrative 
suspension may have is In re Seltzer.28  In this case, Ms. Seltzer alleged 
she failed to receive four notices sent to her by the California State Bar 
concerning the non-payment of her annual bar membership fees.29  
by a lawyer under administrative suspension even though the lawyer was unaware of the 
suspension). 
 23.  Much of the enforcement of unauthorized practice of law provisions is through civil 
injunction or civil fine.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENT PROTECTION, 2012 
SURVEY OF UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEES, chart II (Apr. 2012), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2012_upl_r
eport_charts.authcheckdam.pdf (noting that thirty-two jurisdictions provide for civil injunctions, 
twenty-two provide for civil contempt and thirteen provide for civil fines) [hereinafter 2012 UPL 
SURVEY].  Some states allow civil actions for those harmed by lawyers violating unauthorized 
practice of law standards.  See, e.g., Fogarty v. Parker, Poe, Adams, & Bernstein, L.L.P., 961 So. 2d 
784 (Ala. 2006).  See generally Susan D. Hoppock, Enforcing Unauthorized Practice of Law 
Prohibitions: The Emergence of the Private Cause of Action and Its Impact on Effective 
Enforcement, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 719, 733–34 (2007) (identifying five states and the District 
of Columbia as recognizing some form of private action for harm caused by unauthorized practice 
of law). 
 24.  Satterwhite v. State, 979 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc with four judges 
dissenting) (upholding criminal conviction for the unauthorized practice of law of lawyer who 
intentionally practiced while under suspension for failure to pay bar dues, even though the lawyer 
subsequently paid those dues and was retroactively reinstated). 
 25.  For example, in Texas, “[a]ny practice of law during such suspension shall constitute 
professional misconduct and subject the member to discipline.” TEX. STATE BAR R. Art. III § 5.  
This point is reiterated under the Texas disciplinary rules, which state that a lawyer shall not 
“engage in the practice of law when the lawyer’s right to practice has been suspended or terminated 
including situations where a lawyer’s right to practice has been administratively suspended for 
failure to timely pay required fees.” TEX. DISCIPL. R. PROF. COND. 8.04(a)(11).  Continued practice 
while under administrative suspension implicates not only the unauthorized practice prohibition in 
the disciplinary rules, but also provisions requiring a lawyer to withdraw from representation when 
the representation will result in violation of the disciplinary rules, prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, and prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  See, 
e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Meyer, 980 N.E.2d 1029, 1031 (Ohio 2012); In re Holmberg, 135 P.3d 
1196 (Kan. 2006). 
 26.  See, e.g., Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495, at *6; cf. Birbower, Montalbano, Condon & Frank, 
PC v. Super. Ct., 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998). 
 27.  In re Wolfe, 961 N.E.2d 994 (Ind. 2011) (finding that practicing while under interim 
suspension for failure to pay bar dues and for a guilty finding in a criminal matter is contempt of 
court).  See generally 2012 UPL SURVEY, supra note 23, at chart II (reporting that 22 jurisdictions 
provide for civil contempt as a remedy for the unauthorized practice of law). 
 28.  Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495. 
 29.  She claimed that the letters came to her secretary who routed them to the firm 
bookkeeper, who failed to pay them, rather than to Ms. Seltzer.  Id. at *5. 
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Given her lack of response, Ms. Seltzer was suspended from practice.  
Two weeks later she became aware of her suspension, immediately paid 
her fees, and her license was reactivated.  During the two weeks in 
which she was suspended, but did not know it, she continued to practice 
law, and even after she learned of her suspension, billed clients for work 
she performed while under the administrative suspension. 
One might think that this mix-up would not lead to further 
discipline.30  After all, Ms. Seltzer had practiced for twenty-eight years 
without discipline.31  By her account, she did not receive the notices that 
she had dues to pay,32 and she cured the problem the minute it came to 
her attention.  There was no question about the quality of her work 
performed during her brief suspension.  But that thought would be 
wrong. 
In continuing to practice while under administrative suspension, she 
was found to have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.33  By 
billing for the work she did while under suspension, she was found to 
have charged an illegal fee.34  By failing to tell her clients about her 
suspension once she learned of it, which would have alerted them that 
they did not have to pay the fee, she was found to have violated the duty 
of communication.35  Add to that failure to cooperate in the 
investigation,36 and failure to release a file to a client in a timely 
matter,37 and you get “a two-year probationary period, conditioned on a 
 30.  The decision to prosecute may have been influenced by other factors such as skepticism 
about whether Ms. Seltzer really failed to receive four notices that her bar fees were due, her similar 
claim that she failed to receive notices about the grievance filed against here, and her failure to 
acknowledge the wrongfulness of her acts.  At the sanctioning stage, the court found the latter factor 
to be of “substantial weight.”  Id. at *9. 
 31.  Id. at *1.  While this did not forestall prosecution, it was considered as a mitigating 
factor.  Id. at *8. 
 32.  Ms. Seltzer argued that given her lack of knowledge of the suspension she lacked the 
requisite intent to violate the disciplinary rules; i.e., her conduct did not constitute a “willful” 
violation of the rules.  Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495, at *4.  The court found that willfulness speaks to 
the act itself, here holding herself out as a lawyer and practicing law while under suspension, not to 
an intent to engage in conduct she knew to be wrong.  Id.  See generally Nancy J. Moore, Mens Rea 
Standards in Lawyer Disciplinary Codes, 23 GEO. J. OF LEGAL ETHICS 1 (2010).  Other courts have 
excused continued practice where the lawyer did not know of the suspension.  See discussion supra 
note 22. 
 33.  Seltzer, 2012 WL 5406495, at *4.  While finding that Ms. Seltzer engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law, the actual charge raised required that such action also constitute an act 
of moral turpitude.  Finding that Ms. Seltzer’s conduct did not rise to this level, since her 
unauthorized practice was inadvertent, this charge was dismissed.  Id. at *5. 
 34.  Id. at *7. 
 35.  Id. at *6. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at *7. 
 
8
Akron Law Review, Vol. 47 [2014], Iss. 1, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol47/iss1/5
ARTICLE 5 GREENBAUM MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2014  11:47 AM 
2014] ADMINISTRATIVE AND INTERIM SUSPENSIONS 73 
60-day actual suspension and a duty to repay the fee that she improperly 
charged her client, plus interest.”38 
While severe, these consequences may be tempered.  In some 
jurisdictions, the administrative suspension may not support reciprocal 
discipline, so a lawyer may continue to practice in another state if 
licensed there.39  Further, reinstatement may be automatic once the 
deficiency is cleared,40 so the lawyer who acts promptly may avoid 
many of these consequences.  In some jurisdictions, once the 
impediment is removed the reinstatement is retroactive to the time of its 
imposition.41  In addition, officials retain prosecutorial discretion in 
deciding whether to pursue disciplinary actions against those practicing 
while under administrative suspension.  Missing a technical licensing 
requirement by a few days while continuing practice may well be 
overlooked, whereas long-continuing failures, coupled with continued 
practice, may not.42 
Of even more concern than the impact of suspension on lawyers, 
however, is the impact an administrative suspension could have on 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Sitcov v. D.C. Bar, 885 A.2d 289, 299 n.16 (D.C. 2005) (citing an earlier case that 
dismissed a reciprocal discipline proceeding because “ an administrative suspension imposed by the 
court of another jurisdiction, based on the member’s failure to participate in Continuing Legal 
Education, did not warrant reciprocal discipline here”).  But see In re Gross, 77 A.D.3d 10 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2010) (imposing reciprocal discipline based on interim suspension entered in Ohio for 
noncompliance with registration and CLE requirements); cf. In re Arthur, 732 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. 2012) 
(imposing reciprocal discipline where lawyer was sanctioned in another state for engaging in 
practice while under an administrative suspension); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gee, 971 N.E.2d 952 
(Ohio 2012) (same). 
 40.  See supra text accompanying note 18. 
 41.  See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 6.01(f) (providing for “retroactive” reinstatement upon 
payment of delinquent registration fee); Tex. ST. B.R., art. 3, § 7 (providing that upon curing a 
delinquency in paying bar dues “the suspension shall automatically be lifted and the member 
restored to former status . . . retroactive to inception of suspension, but [that] shall not affect any 
proceeding for discipline of the member for professional misconduct”).  Even with retroactive 
reinstatement, however, a lawyer will still be liable for unauthorized practice of law for continued 
practice while the suspension was in effect.  See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 6.05; Satterwhite v. State, 
979 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Sherman, 945 
S.W.2d 227 (Tex. App. 1997).  Other states do not make reinstatement from administrative 
suspensions retroactive in the usual case.  See, e.g., In re Hartwig, 515 N.W.2d 265, 266-68 (Wis. 
1994) (allowing for retroactive reinstatement for failure to report CLE compliance only upon 
showing of “sufficiently compelling circumstances” usually involving the fault of another involved 
in CLE administration); Sitcov, 885 A.2d, at 301-02 (finding reinstatement after curing failure to 
pay bar dues retroactive only if the suspension resulted from error or omission by the Bar). 
 42.  Interview with Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, Supreme Court of Ohio, in 
Columbus, Ohio (Mar. 11, 2013).  See, e.g., People v. Carpenter, 922 P.2d 939 (Colo. 1996) 
(imposing three-year suspension where lawyer handled more than 150 cases over a five-year period 
while under administrative suspension for failure to meet mandatory CLE requirements). 
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clients.  If the lawyer honors the suspension and ceases work on client 
matters, the client is left in the lurch, scrambling to find other 
representation.  If the lawyer continues representing the client, the work 
done on the client’s behalf may be considered a nullity. 
In many jurisdictions, actions taken on behalf of clients by 
individuals who are not authorized to practice law there are considered 
invalid under the so-called “nullity rule.”43  For example, the filing of a 
complaint by one unauthorized to practice is treated as though the 
complaint was never filed, which might result in the running of the 
statute of limitations before the problem is cured.  Lawyers who have 
been suspended from practice for any reason are not, during that period, 
authorized to practice law.  Even if the suspension arises from failure to 
meet one’s CLE requirements, or failure to pay required registration fees 
to the court or the bar, actions taken on a client’s behalf during that 
period fall prey to this rule.44  This may be true even where the lawyer 
has no actual notice of the suspension.45 
This seems a harsh result.46  The client is punished for the sins of its 
lawyer whom the client thought was authorized to practice, but was 
not.47 
 43.  States vary as to whether they recognize the nullity rule, and if they do, what exceptions, 
if any, they allow.  See, e.g., Downtown Disposal Serv., Inc. v. City of Chicago, 979 N.E.2d 50, 54–
55 (Ill. 2012) (collecting cases); see generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Right of Party 
Litigant to Defend or Counterclaim on Ground that Opposing Party or His Attorney Is Engaged in 
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 7 A.L.R. 4th 1146 (1981 & Cum. Supp.).  I do not address here 
whether or not the nullity rule should exist in some form in some circumstances.  Rather, I simply 
recognize that the rule exists in some jurisdictions and address whether it makes sense for actions 
taken by a lawyer under administrative suspensions. 
 44.  See, e.g., Nerri v. Adu-Gyamfi, 613 S.E.2d 429 (Va. 2005) (complaint held a nullity 
where filed by a lawyer on administrative suspension for non-compliance with CLE requirements, 
failure to pay membership dues, and failure to file an insurance certification).  The dissent was 
“compelled to acknowledge that the majority’s holding . . . is consistent with the view held by the 
majority of other jurisdictions.”  Id. at 431 (Koontz, J., dissenting).  For a contrary opinion, see 
Owens v. Bank of Brewton, 302 So. 2d 114 (Ala. Civ. App. 1974) (holding that the nullity rule 
should not be invoked to void an appeal filed by a lawyer who had been admitted to the bar but had 
ceased to practice and failed to secure a required lawyer’s occupational license at the time the 
appeal was filed). 
 45.  See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 635 S.E.2d 694, 696 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (appeal of action 
treated as a nullity where it was filed by a lawyer under administrative suspension, even though the 
lawyer was unaware of the suspension). 
 46.  Cf. Geri L. Dreiling, Bright-Line Blunder, A.B.A.J. E-REPORT, Dec. 8, 2006, at 2 
(quoting Hasting’s law professor, Rory Little, describing the application of the nullity rule in a 
situation in which the suspension is administrative and unknown to the lawyer or the client as “just 
outrageous”). 
 47.  In rejecting the application of the nullity rule in an instance where out-of-state counsel 
filed a complaint for a client in Florida but was not authorized under state law to do so, the Florida 
Supreme Court instead allowed the pleading to be amended to be signed by a lawyer licensed in the 
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Depending on the jurisdiction, however, exceptions may be 
recognized to the nullity rule.  The question becomes whether 
suspensions for administrative failures should fall within these 
exceptions.  Opinions from Illinois, which has a particularly rich and 
evolving case law on the nullity rule, provide a template upon which to 
explore this issue. 
For example, in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry,48 a circuit court 
granted a motion to vacate an attorney fee award on the grounds that the 
underlying activity which justified the award was conducted by 
attorneys who were not authorized to practice since they had had failed 
to register their corporate form with this Illinois Supreme Court, as 
required.49  The lower court reasoned that, because of this, the activity 
was a nullity so no award could flow from it.50  The Illinois Supreme 
Court reversed, noting that the nullity rule applies when representation is 
undertaken by those not licensed to practice law.  Here, the lawyers were 
licensed; they simply had failed to register their corporate form.  While 
that would have consequences if the lawyers attempted to claim their 
corporate form for some purpose, such as to limit liability, it did not 
undercut their work undertaken for clients.  The nullity rule, as the court 
explained, protects clients, other parties, and the courts from the dangers 
of representation by those unlicensed to do so, but the mere act of failure 
to register a corporate form does not raise those concerns.51 
The implications of Sperry are unclear.  At its broadest, it suggests 
that mere administrative failures are insufficient to trigger the nullity 
rule.  Failure to pay registration fees or to fulfill CLE requirements may 
be seen to fall here.  In this regard, it should be noted that the court 
supported its argument, in part, on a case finding no Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel violation where the lawyer representing the defendant 
had failed to pay his annual registration dues with the court.52 
state.  It did so because of the concern that “the nullity rule places the burden on the unwary litigant, 
not the offending attorney” and that is “too harsh a penalty.” Torrey v. Leesburg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 
769 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 2000).  But see Dreiling, supra note 46, at 1 (quoting Washburn law 
professor, Shelia Reynolds, to the effect that while one might naturally feel sympathy for the client, 
agency principles bind the client to the acts of its agent). 
 48.  Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Sperry, 827 N.E.2d 422 (Ill. 2005). 
 49.  Illinois requires those practicing in various corporate forms, such as an LLP or LLC, to 
obtain a certificate of registration from the Illinois Supreme Court.  See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 721(c). 
 50.  Sperry, 827 N.E.2d at 423. 
 51.  Id. at 430–33.  An oft-quoted description of the purpose the nullity rule is “to protect 
litigants against the mistakes of the ignorant and the schemes of the unscrupulous and to protect the 
court itself in the administration of its proceedings from those lacking requisite skills.”  Janiczek v. 
Dover Mgmt. Co., 481 N.E.2d 25, 26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). 
 52.  Sperry, 827 N.E.2d at 432.  For further discussion of the impact practicing while under 
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Read more narrowly, Sperry simply says that defects unrelated to 
active licensure (here failure to register the firm’s corporate form) do not 
trigger the rule.  Suspensions for any reason, in contrast, compromise 
licensure itself, and the rule should be in play absent other limitations 
upon it. 
A similar result was reached in Applebaum v. Rush University 
Medical Center,53 in which the Illinois Supreme Court refused to apply 
the nullity rule where representation was undertaken by an attorney who 
was on voluntary inactive status.  The court stressed that the attorney 
remained licensed to practice law.  That he was not “entitled” to do so 
because he had chosen to be on inactive status did not change this fact.  
In reaching this conclusion, the court stressed the difference between 
representation by those not licensed to practice law in the jurisdiction 
and those who, although licensed, were otherwise ineligible to do so.54 
The Applebaum court also emphasized that the nullity rule should 
only be invoked when its concerns, protection of clients and the court 
from the harms that might arise from unlicensed representation, are 
implicated.55  Representation by unlicensed individuals raises those 
concerns, whereas representation by a licensed attorney on inactive 
status does not.  In passing, the court recognized that because of the 
harsh result the nullity rule imposes on clients, “it should be invoked 
only where it fulfills its purposes of protecting both the public and the 
integrity of the court system from the action of the unlicensed, and 
where no alternative remedy is possible.”56 
As in Sperry, the implications of the Applebaum decision for 
administrative suspensions are mixed.  The Applebaum court 
characterized practicing while on voluntary inactive status as violation 
of a “technical or administrative rule.”57  Like Sperry, the court relied on 
a case finding no Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation where the 
lawyer representing the defendant had failed to pay his annual 
registration dues with the court.58  Failure to pay registration fees or to 
complete the required CLE hours would seem to fall here. 
The court set forth a multi-part test, limiting application of the 
nullity rule to instances “where it fulfills its purposes of protecting both 
administrative suspension has on the sixth amendment rights of defendants see infra text 
accompanying note 67. 
 53.  Applebaum v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 899 N.E.2d 262 (Ill. 2008). 
 54.  Id. at 270. 
 55.  Id. at 272. 
 56.  Id. at 266. 
 57.  Id. at 270. 
 58.  Id. 
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the public and the integrity of the court system from the action of the 
unlicensed, and where no alternative remedy is possible.”59  This test 
also argues against the imposition of the nullity rule for administrative 
suspensions.  It suggests that there are three factors to consider, all of 
which must be implicated – (1) the need for protection of the public, (2) 
the need for protection of the integrity of the court system, and (3) a lack 
of an alternative remedy.  Does failure to pay registration fees or to 
fulfill CLE requirements harm both the public and the court? Arguably, 
failure to pay a registration fee harms the court system, but not the 
public if the latter is defined as those being represented.60  Failure to 
fulfill CLE requirements may harm both, as under-educated lawyers 
threaten clients and courts alike.  But in either case, there are alternative 
remedies – fines, discipline, and other remedies recognized for the 
unauthorized practice of law.61 
On the other hand, the Applebaum case arose out of a single 
representation by the lawyer of the estate of his father to which the 
lawyer was the sole beneficiary.  The court minimized the misconduct 
on these facts finding that although there was a failure to “comply with 
the technical provisions of the rule [forbidding practice by those on 
inactive status], it [was] less certain whether he violated its spirit . . . .”62  
Perhaps the court would have proceeded differently if the lawyer had 
engaged in multiple representations of truly distinct clients. 
In its most recent decision on this topic, the Illinois Supreme Court, 
over a strenuous dissent, seemed to change its focus.  In Downtown 
Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, a corporation’s president filed 
a complaint for administrative review when, in fact, the complaint had to 
be filed by an attorney.63  The court concluded that the nullity rule need 
not be invoked on the facts before it and articulated a new test to 
determine whether it should be applied.  Under this test the court is to 
consider: 
 59.  Applebaum v. Rush Univ. Med. Ctr., 899 N.E.2d at 266. 
 60.  To the extent registration fees are used to pay for the disciplinary process, client security 
funds, or access to justice programs, the public is harmed, but that does not appear to be the thrust 
of the court’s test. 
 61.  See, e.g., Torrey v. Leesburg Reg’l Med. Ctr., 769 So. 2d 1040, 1045 (Fla. 2000) 
(rejecting the nullity rule and noting the availability of unauthorized practice of law remedies and 
disciplinary actions where a complaint was filed by a lawyer neither licensed in the state nor 
admitted pro hac vice); cf. In re Seltzer, No. 08-O-13227 & 09-O-12258, 2012 WL 5406495 (Cal. 
State Bar Ct. Review Dep’t June 19, 2012) (imposing discipline for continued practice while under 
an administrative suspension). 
 62.  Applebaum, 899 N.E.2d at 273. 
 63.  Downtown Disposal Services, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 979 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 2012). 
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whether the nonattorney’s conduct is done without knowledge that the 
action was improper, whether the corporation acted diligently in cor-
recting the mistake by obtaining counsel, whether the nonattorney’s 
participation is minimal, and whether the participation results in preju-
dice to the opposing party.  The circuit court may properly dismiss an 
action where the nonlawyer’s participation on behalf of the corporation 
is substantial, or the corporation does not take prompt action to correct 
the defect.64 
If this is the test, how should we treat representation by a lawyer under 
suspension when that fact is unknown to the client?65  Assuming the 
lawyer’s status is unknown to the client, the issue then would seem to 
turn on whether the suspended lawyer knew of the suspension, the 
degree of the suspended lawyer’s participation while under suspension, 
and whether true prejudice to the opposing party can be shown.  Even 
then, the court merely listed the factors to be considered rather than the 
outcome if some, but not all, are implicated. 
As for my recommendation, I think the rule drafters should spell 
out clearly the implications of practicing while under an administrative 
suspension.  I believe the nullity rule should apply where the client 
knows the lawyer is suspended but hires the lawyer anyway, unless the 
lawyer misleads the client about his authority to act while under 
suspension.  Here, the client lacks clean hands and is not punished 
unfairly by the rule.  If the lawyer knows of the suspension, but the 
client does not, penalties should be enforced against the lawyer, not the 
client.66 
Concern also arises about the impact of administrative suspensions 
 64.  Id. at 57. 
 65.  One interesting appellate level case in Illinois seems to treat reasonable reliance that the 
representative is a licensed attorney as sufficient to avoid imposition of the nullity rule.  Janiczek v. 
Dover Mgmt. Co., 481 N.E.2d 25, 26–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).  There the court refused to apply the 
nullity rule in an instance where the lawyer was in active practice when originally hired, but was 
disbarred before he filed the complaint on the client’s behalf, and the client lacked knowledge of the 
disbarment. 
 66.  This seems analogous to the way we treat the attorney-client privilege where the 
communication involves a suspended lawyer.  As a general matter, the attorney-client privilege 
applies to communication between a lawyer and a client involving legal services.  An individual 
who, although admitted to the bar, is not on active status or is under a suspension, should not be 
treated as a lawyer for this purpose.  See, e.g., 24 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, EVIDENCE § 5480 (1st ed. 1986).  But see Gucci America, Inc. v. Guess?, 
Inc., No. 09 Civ. 4373(SAS), 2011 WL 9375, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011).  In most jurisdictions, 
however, an exception lies where the client reasonably believes that its confidant is a lawyer with 
the authority to practice.  See, e.g., EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE 
ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 6.9.2 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS §72(1) reporter’s note to cmt (e) (2000). 
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on the system.  Substituting counsel for those suspended will lead to 
delay in pending actions.  In criminal proceedings, practice undertaken 
by lawyers while suspended may lead clients to challenge their 
convictions on ineffective-assistance-of-counsel grounds.67  While often 
unsuccessful, they still occupy the court’s time. 
What then is the solution?  Is there a better way to assure bar dues 
are paid, or CLE credits earned, without requiring the cessation of 
practice and the attendant costs that imposes on clients, other parties, 
and other lawyers, as well as the offending lawyer?  Fines68 coupled 
with a requirement to cure the administrative delinquency or face 
contempt charges, disciplinary actions,69 even criminal penalties might 
 67.  While jurisdictions vary, the vast majority of cases hold that representation by a lawyer 
on administrative suspension is not the ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., People v. Ngo, 
924 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1996) (holding “that representation of a criminal defendant by an attorney 
who has been involuntarily enrolled on inactive status for MCLE noncompliance does not, in itself, 
amount to [ineffective assistance of counsel]”); People v. Brigham, 600 N.E.2d 1178, 1181 (Ill. 
1992) (noting that “[a]lthough the present issue is one of first impression for this court, other 
jurisdictions have dealt with it on numerous occasions, almost unanimously concluding that an 
attorney whose license has been suspended for failure to pay his dues still may be ‘counsel’ for sixth 
amendment purposes”); Henson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 186, 194–195 (Tex. App. 1996) (same).  But 
see People v. Brewer, 279 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (noting “that the failure of an 
attorney to remit his state bar dues is strong evidence that such attorney is no longer sufficiently 
interested in the practice of law to adequately defend his client’s interests.  For this reason, we 
remand the instant matter for an evidentiary hearing in order that the following may be established: 
first, whether defendant’s allegations with respect to his attorney’s suspension from practice are 
accurate; second, whether the defendant received inadequate assistance of counsel”); Pennsylvania 
v. Grant, 992 A.2d 152, 160–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010) (finding that failure to fulfill CLE 
requirements over extended period of time reflects a lack of competence implicating ineffective 
assistance of counsel). 
 68.  See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n, CLE Comm’n v. Clendenin, 941 S.W.2d 477, 478 (Ky. 1997) 
(imposing a fine rather than suspension for “habitual violation of the CLE rules [because] [w]hile 
imposition of such punishment would not be too severe, the effect would be to punish others such as 
clients and courts who are not to blame for respondent’s violations”).  This is not to suggest that 
such a remedy if foolproof.  Mr. Clendenin was subject to a later suit for similar misconduct in 
intervening years, and again was fined rather than suspended, on the same rationale.  Ky. Bar Ass’n, 
CLE Comm’n v. Clendenin, 11 S.W.3d 24 (Ky. 2000).  But cf. Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Burnside, 50 
S.W.3d 147, 148 (Ky. 2001) (imposing fine for failure to complete CLE with the caveat that 
“[f]ailure to either pay the fine or complete the CLE requirements in the future will result in 
suspension”).  See generally Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About the 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 78 (1998) (noting that 
“fines may . . .  provide more effective discipline in cases where enforcers may prefer expressive 
sanctions because incapacitating sanctions are viewed as too harsh, but where expressive sanctions 
alone may prove too mild and ineffective from a deterrence perspective”).  By this logic, a fine 
coupled with public reporting of the default might be preferable to interim suspension. 
 69.  See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n v. Keesee, 892 S.W.2d 578 (Ky. 1995) (imposing a public 
reprimand for failing to comply with CLE requirements and ignoring notices of CLE deficiencies 
lawyer admitted receiving); cf. In re McDonald, 775 A.2d 1085 (D.C. 2001) (applying reciprocal 
discipline to a Delaware judgment imposing public reprimand for CLE noncompliance and failure 
to respond to disciplinary authority inquires). 
 
15
Greenbaum: Administrative and Interim Suspensions
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2014
ARTICLE 5 GREENBAUM MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 2/7/2014  11:47 AM 
80 AKRON LAW REVIEW [47:65 
be better devices to forestall the collateral consequences of 
administrative suspension. 
Ultimately, an assessment must be made about the effectiveness of 
these alternatives.  Is the threat of suspension a necessary inducement to 
secure compliance with administrative requirements, or would other 
approaches work as well?70  Cost implications also must be considered 
both in terms of the direct cost of pursuing each remedy and indirect 
costs the remedies impose.71 
Whether the penalty invoked is an administrative suspension or 
some other device, its imposition should be influenced by the culpability 
of the lawyer.72  I would treat flagrant disregard of a known obligation 
and inadvertent failure to follow it differently.  In the former situation, I 
agree that some sort of sanction is warranted.  In the latter, however, I 
would suggest a different approach.  Where it is clear that the lawyer has 
not received notice, additional and different types of notice should be 
tried.73  Where it is unclear, as was the case in Seltzer,74 I would still 
 70.  See generally Drury D. Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, FCPA Sanctions: Too Big to 
Debar?, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 775 (2011) (arguing, in the context of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
enforcement, that the threat of a suspension or debarment remedy would achieve greater compliance 
than the threat of fine). 
 71.  For example, to the extent the administrative misconduct involves failure to pay a fee 
which, in turn, is used to support other endeavors, like a client security fund, and if the threat of 
suspension spurs greater compliance, then substituting other remedies may have unintended 
financial consequences.  Alternatively, if a fine approach is used and it secures payment of not only 
the fee but of the fine as well, the revenues collected might, in fact, increase.  But cf. Ezra Ross & 
Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and White-Collar Fines and 
Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 456 (2011) (noting that “[a]dministrative agencies never 
collect the vast brunt of [the fines they impose]”). 
 72.  A difficult issue arises if the failure to receive notice stems from the lawyer’s failure to 
inform authorities when the lawyer’s address has changed, the most common cause for lack of 
notice, which in turn results in a lack of compliance.  See, e.g., John F. Harkness, The Aftermath of 
Dues, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1988, at 5.  Since the lawyer has a duty to keep a current address on file with 
the authorities, the lawyer is ultimately responsible for the lack of notice and any administrative 
defaults that result.  See, e.g., Joyce E. Peters, Dues and Don’ts, WASH. LAW., July/Aug. 2002, at 
16.  Further, repeated failures to timely comply with administrative requirements may provide 
constructive notice as to when the obligations fall.  See, e.g., People v. Harris, 915 N.E.2d 103, 110 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (finding chronic late payment of Michigan attorney registration fees “supports a 
conclusion that he knew he would be suspended from the Michigan bar for his non-payment” and 
hence when the time for payment passed he knew he was practicing under suspension despite his 
insistence that he had not received notice of his suspension).  Nevertheless, if many of these cases, 
at their core, are really about lawyers failing to keep up current addresses, one wonders how severe 
a sanction that mistake should justify.  Cf. In re Owusu, 886 A.2d 536, 540-41 (D.C. 2005) 
(recognizing that absent some showing that failure to keep a current address is a deliberate act to 
thwart a disciplinary proceeding, that act, and the failure to cooperate in a disciplinary proceeding of 
which he received no notice because disciplinary authorities lacked a current address, is not a 
disciplinary violation but only a violation of an administrative Bar rule). 
 73.  See, e.g., In re Sonnenreich, 86 P.3d 712, 720–23 (Utah 2004) (refusing to allow 
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impose a penalty, but it would be rescinded retroactively upon a 
successful showing that notice of the required administrative action had 
not been received. 
Prosecutorial discretion also plays a role.  Where the failure is 
inadvertent, short lived, and quickly remedied once the lawyer learned of 
the dues or CLE delinquency, disciplinary counsel should seldom pursue 
ethics violations for limited practice undertaken while under 
administrative suspension.  While the lawyer may still suffer other 
consequences for this unauthorized practice of law, such as possible fee 
forfeiture,75 if the time is short, few fees will be compromised and many 
clients will still pay for the service, even if they have the right to 
challenge those fees. 
There also may be some need to assess whether all administrative 
suspensions should be treated equally.  For example, in the District of 
Columbia, failure to file a registration statement with the bar results in a 
mandatory summary suspension, whereas failure to pay dues does not.76 
Suspension is allowed in the latter case, but not required.  In Ohio, a 
suspension for failure to follow the state’s attorney registration 
requirements is a disciplinary offense, whereas a suspension for failure 
to meet compulsory CLE requirements is not.77  In contrast, at least one 
court has held that representing a criminal defendant while failing to pay 
a registration fee should not be treated as ineffective assistance of 
counsel, whereas such representation while under suspension for failure 
to earn CLE credits, at least over an extended period, might be.78 
If a state decides to vary the consequences for different forms of 
administrative suspension, it may be difficult to rank the violations.  
Presumably failure to register should be treated most seriously as it 
interferes with the state’s attempt to contact lawyers should questions 
about their conduct be raised.  This goes to the heart of the disciplinary 
system.  Filings pertaining to trust account activities might fall in this 
category as well since the information is necessary to help track possible 
trust account violations which can harm clients.  In contrast, while 
failure to comply with CLE requirements may harm the public if, by this 
discipline for practicing under suspension where the lawyer did not receive actual notice of the 
suspension and requiring mail service signed for by the attorney or personal service upon her).  See 
generally In re Kennedy, 542 A.2d 1225, 1229 (D.C. 1988) (providing that “reasonable claims to a 
lack of knowledge of the suspension for failure to pay bar dues should be taken into account”). 
 74.  See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 75.  See supra note 26. 
 76.  Compare R. GOV’G D.C. BAR II § 2(3) (registration), with id. § 6 (dues payment). 
 77.  See supra note 20. 
 78.  Commonwealth v. Grant, 992 A.2d 152, 159–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2010). 
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failure, the lawyer fails to keep up with developments in the law, the 
harm to the disciplinary system is less direct. 
III. OUTSIDE CONDUCT SUSPENSIONS 
Another set of suspensions flow from failure to comply with other 
requirements not directly related to law licensure.  For example, in a 
number of states, failure to pay taxes,79 student loan debt,80 or to be 
found in default in making court-ordered child-support payments81 can 
 79.  IOWA CT. R. 35.22 (authorizing license suspension where an attorney owes at least 
$1,000 in debt being collected by the Central Collections Unit (CCU) of the Iowa Department of 
Revenue for delinquent court fines, unpaid taxes, or debt owed to the Department of Natural 
Resources); see, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Hearity, 812 N.W.2d 614, 617 (Iowa 
2012) (noting earlier suspension under this provision).  In Iowa, such suspensions are treated as 
prior discipline, an aggravating factor in subsequent disciplinary actions.  See Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 
Disciplinary Bd. v. McCuskey, 814 N.W.2d 250, 258 (Iowa 2012).  In 2012, forty-two lawyers were 
referred for suspension under this provision, and nine failed to resolve their defaults and were 
suspended).  E-mail from Wayne Cooper, Executive Officer, Iowa Department of Revenue, to 
Arthur F. Greenbaum, Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law (April 2, 2013 14:04 CST) (on file 
with author). 
  In some states the automatic suspension flows from failure to pay an occupational tax 
applicable to attorneys.  See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 32 (requiring suspension of lawyers who 
fail to pay occupational tax for two or more consecutive years); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 
191.1441(a) (West 2008) (suspension required for failure to pay occupational tax or related penalty 
within 90 days after its due date).  Unlike the Iowa provision, these are directly related to law 
practice and are therefore more closely akin to administrative suspensions, but still differ as they are 
intended as a revenue source for the state itself rather than part of the lawyer regulatory process.  
See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 191.145 (West 2008); E-mail from Garrett Guillory, Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Tenn. Dep’t of Rev., to Ingrid Mattson, Reference Librarian, Moritz College of Law (June 14, 
2013, 09:33 EST) (on file with author). 
 80.  IOWA CT. R 35.21(authorizing automatic suspension of license to practice law in Iowa for 
attorney who “defaults on an obligation owed to or collected by the College Student Aid 
Commission”); HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-1 (2008) (authorizing suspension for default or breach of 
any obligation under any student loan, repayment contract, or scholarship without further review or 
hearing); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11B (authorizing temporary suspension where student loan entity certifies 
that a lawyer is in default on payment of a student loan guaranteed by a state or the federal 
government); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 623.1 (2008 & Supp.  2013) (authorizing, but not requiring, 
suspension for student loan default); Tex. Sup. Ct. Order, Misc. Docket No. 96-9155 (June 18, 
1996), available at http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/miscdocket/96/96-9155.pdf; see generally 
Terri Harris, Student Loan Default Could Result in License Revocation, TENN. B.J., Aug. 2010, at 
14.  The degree to which suspensions are entered for student loan defaults appears to vary widely.  
For example, in Iowa, only one suspension has ever been entered under the rule.  E-mail from Paul 
H. Wieck II, Director, Iowa Office of Professional Regulation to Marissa Black (June 11, 2013, 
14:32 EST) (on file with author).  In contrast, in Texas, there are presently 309 attorneys whose 
licenses are suspended due to student loan defaults.  Telephone Interview by Marissa Black with 
Sandy Garvin, Office Administrator of the State Bar of Texas Membership Department (June 28, 
2013).  To the extent the failure to repay student loans is done in bad faith, this may constitute a 
standard disciplinary violation subject to full hearing and the range of disciplinary sanctions.  See, 
e.g., ILL. R. PROF’L COND. 8.4(i). 
 81.  See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.8.5; OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5(A)(1)(b); MD. R. ON CTS., 
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trigger a suspension until payment is received or a payment plan is 
entered into.82  Provisions concerning license suspension for failure to 
pay child support are, in fact, a requirement of federal law.83  Similar 
concerns are sometimes treated under the general protections authorizing 
interim suspensions to prevent a threat of public harm.84  This section 
considers the efficacy of using the threat of suspension to secure 
compliance with financial obligations unrelated to the practice of law.  I 
conclude that suspensions for default under such provisions should be 
authorized only where a strong correlation between the default and a 
threat of harm to the public or fitness to practice concerns can be shown.  
In assessing whether to impose such suspensions, the circumstances 
surrounding the default should be considered. 
The justification for suspensions in this area is twofold.  The first 
JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-778(d); MINN. R. LAWYERS PROF. RESP. 30(a); N.J. CT. R. 5:7-5(e)(4); N.Y. 
JUD. LAW § 90 (2-a.a).  The failure to make such payments, in the face of a court order to do so, 
may also give rise to a full disciplinary action as conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice 
and conduct that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.  See, e.g., Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Redfield, 878 N.E.2d 10, 12-13 (Ohio 2007) (finding these violations where the lawyer 
was in substantial arrears in his child support over a multi-year period).  Depending on the 
circumstances, credit for the time served on the interim suspension may be given toward a 
permanent suspension order.  Id. at 14-15 (contrasting cases where credit has and has not been 
given). 
 82.  See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5(D)(1)(c) (predicating reinstatement from a suspension 
for failure to pay child support on receipt of “[a] notice from a court or child support enforcement 
agency that the . . . attorney is no longer in default under a child support order or is subject to a 
withholding or deduction notice or a new or modified child support order to collect current support 
or any arrearage due under the child support order that was in default and is complying with that 
notice or order”); Tex. Sup. Ct. Order, Misc. Docket No. 96-9155 (June 18, 1996), available at 
http://www.supreme.courts.state.tx.us/miscdocket/96/96-9155.pdf (providing for reinstatement from 
a suspension for student loan default upon the lawyer entering into a repayment agreement).  
Sometimes applicable penalties, interest and fees will also need to be satisfied.  See, e.g., TENN. 
SUP. CT. R. 9 § 32.7 (conditioning reinstatement for suspension for occupational tax delinquency on 
both curing the delinquency and satisfying these collateral obligations as well); TEX. TAX CODE 
ANN. § 191.1441(b) (West 2008). 
 83.  42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(16) (2011) (codifying the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193)). 
In order to satisfy section 654(20)(A) of this title, each State must have in effect laws re-
quiring the use of . . . [p]rocedures under which the State has (and uses in appropriate 
cases) authority to withhold or suspend, or to restrict the use of driver’s licenses, profes-
sional and occupational licenses, and recreational and sporting licenses of individuals 
owing overdue support or failing, after receiving appropriate notice, to comply with sub-
poenas or warrants relating to paternity or child support proceedings. 
Id. 
 84.  See, e.g., N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(iv) (allowing interim suspension on a harm to the public 
rationale based on “the attorney’s willful failure or refusal to pay money owed to a client, which 
debt is demonstrated by an admission, a judgment, or other clear and convincing evidence”).  For an 
application of this rule see In re Stewart, 934 N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (entering an 
interim suspension for failure to pay a $50,345.21 judgment). 
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reflects a public policy that these are obligations with which we want all 
citizens to comply.85  The law-licensure system is simply a vehicle to 
achieve these goals when the violator happens to be a lawyer.86  Second, 
is a fear that certain kinds of acts raise such serious fitness to practice 
concerns that immediate license suspension is appropriate.87  Exactly 
what conduct is sufficiently reprehensible or predictive of broader 
misbehavior in carrying out one’s practice, however, is an open 
question. 
For example, suspensions for failure to pay student loans have been 
justified on the ground that such conduct calls into question “the 
integrity of lawyers who either selfishly refuse to pay back their student 
loans or have so mismanaged their finances that they are unable to pay 
them back” and who may accordingly mismanage or convert client 
funds.88  The data, however, suggest otherwise. 
 85.  In fact, license revocation is imposed for failure to pay child support or student loan 
obligations across occupational categories.  See, e.g., WESTLAW, 50 State Survey – Revocation of 
Professional Licenses for Failure to Pay Support, 0080 SURVEYS 6 (2012) (listing state statues 
mandating  the revocation of a wide range of professional and occupational licenses for failure to 
pay child support); Student Loan Borrower Assistance, License Revocations, 
http://www.studentloanborrowerassistance.org/collections/government-collection-tools/license-
revocations (last visited June 4, 2013) (noting that a number of states impose license revocation for 
student loan defaults covering a variety of professions and vocations that require licensing).  In this 
article I only explore the propriety of such suspensions in the lawyer regulatory context, although 
similar concerns may apply in other settings as well.  Alternatively, if one embraces the general 
proposition that license suspension is an appropriate collections tool, there may be no reason to treat 
lawyers differently than those in other occupations. 
 86.  See, e.g., Margaret Graham Tebo, When Dad Won’t Pay, 86 A.B.A. J. 54, 56–57 (2000) 
(quoting Teresa Kaiser, executive director of Maryland’s child support enforcement agency, stating 
“Maryland, like many other states using license revocation as an enforcement tool, doesn’t limit 
suspensions to driver’s licenses.  Anyone who needs a Maryland license or certificate to pursue an 
occupation-for example, a doctor, lawyer, architect or teacher-is subject to losing it for failure to 
pay child support . . . .  ‘The aim is not to suspend anybody’s license to practice their livelihood . . . 
The aim is to collect money that is legally due to support their own children.’”). 
 87.  Cf. George L. Blum, Annotation, Failure to Pay Creditors as Affecting Moral Character 
for Purposes of Admission to the Bar, 108 A.L.R.5th 289, 289 (2003) (noting that, at the bar 
admission stage, failure to pay creditors in a variety of contexts is seen both as a disregard for the 
law and a possible inability to properly handle client funds in the future). 
 88.  Harris, supra note 80, at 16; cf. In re Steffen, 261 P.3d 1254, 1255-56 (Or. 2011) (noting, 
as part of the character and fitness inquiry, that “because lawyers frequently hold client funds in 
trust, an applicant’s problems handling money (either the applicant’s own or funds belonging to 
others) raises concern about the applicant’s ability to handle client funds with ‘scrupulous 
probity’”).  Even large debt loads that are being handled short of default may promote unethical 
conduct.  Based on anecdotal evidence, an Illinois state bar commission noted that “debt may place 
additional pressure on lawyers to commit ethical violations” relating to competence, diligence, fees, 
conflict of interest, safekeeping of client property, withdrawal, expediting litigation, professional 
independence, and advertising.  ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N, SPECIAL COMM. ON THE IMPACT OF LAW 
SCHOOL DEBT ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 30 
(March 8, 2013) [hereinafter IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT].  Further, failure to enroll in income-
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A recent Illinois report on the impact of law school debt on lawyer 
conduct identified nine ethical rules that might be compromised by 
lawyers with high student debt loads, but conceded that the state 
disciplinary authority “has not noticed a significant number of debt-
related complaints against attorneys in the last several years, nor has it 
noticed a disproportionate number of complaints against young attorneys 
(those with the heaviest debt loads).”89  Another recent study explored 
the predictive effects of factors considered at the character and fitness 
stage on the chance of later discipline in practice and found that “the 
probability of subsequent discipline for someone with a student loan 
default is . . . only 5%.”90  The authors conclude that given this, student 
loan default is a “very poor predictor[] of subsequent misconduct” and 
thus probably should not be “sufficient to justify some kind of corrective 
or preventive action.”91  Whether this conclusion applies to law school 
loan defaults while in practice is not clear,92 but it certainly suggests 
caution before concluding that such defaults pose a real threat to clients 
or the public that must be curbed. 
The impact of imposing suspensions for student loan defaults also 
should be considered.  Looking at law school debt alone, the ABA 
Section of Legal Education and Admissions reports that for 2010-2011, 
the latest year for which information is available, the average law school 
loan debt for graduates who took out at least one law school loan was 
$75,728 for public law schools, and $124,950 for private law schools.93  
Nearly 90 percent of all law students took out loans.94  When 
based repayment plans might itself suggest competence issues.  See generally infra note 99. 
 89.  IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, supra note 88, at 30. 
 90.  Leslie Levin, et al. A Study of  the Relationship Between Bar Admissions Data and 
Subsequent Lawyer Discipline. ___ LAW & SOC. INQUIRY ____ (2014). 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Arguably defaults while in practice may pose a greater risk than earlier occurring 
defaults.  First, the default has occurred when the individual is older, thus minimizing the argument 
that the default resulted from immaturity and might be overlooked.  Second, pre-admission defaults 
pose no direct threat to clients.  Assuring that the applicant has a reasonable plan to handle the 
problem in the future, before admission is allowed, may give regulators sufficient confidence that 
future clients will not be harmed.  In contrast, defaults by those already in practice, who thus have 
access to clients, may create a temptation to take on representations that should be declined, charge 
excessive fees, or steal client funds to help make ends meet.  On the other hand, one might expect 
such improper behavior to stave off defaults, and the Illinois study cited above did not find that to 
date. 
 93.  Average Amount Borrowed for Law School 2001-2010, A.B.A. SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. 
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE Bar, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_education_and_admissions_to_the_bar/statistics/avg_amnt_brwd.authcheckda
m.pdf. 
 94.  Almanac of Higher Education: Trends in Student-Loan Debt for Graduate and 
Professional Students, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 24, 2009), 
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undergraduate debt and other law-school related costs are included, 
“debt burdens of upwards of $150,000 or even $200,000 [are] 
common.”95 
While debt loads are on the rise, the job prospects for lawyers 
remain weak.  The National Association of Law Placement reported that 
the employment rate for the Class of 2011 was the lowest since 1994 and 
reflected “a job market that continued to have underlying structural 
weakness.”96  The data for the Class of 2012 show slight improvement 
on some measures, but those reported as “unemployed/seeking” rose to 
more than 10% of the graduates.97  Even those with jobs often have 
salaries far too low to make their requisite loan payments.98 
In a world of diminished job prospects and rising debt, student loan 
defaults are likely to rise.99 The threat of suspension, in this context, 
http://chronicle.com/article/Trends-in-Student-Loan-Debt/48056/. 
 95.  IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, supra note 88, at 13. 
 96.  Class of 2011 Has Lowest Employment Rate Since Class of 1994, NALP BULLETIN (July 
2012), http://www.nalp.org/0712research. 
 97.  ABA Releases Class of 2012 Law Graduate Employment Data, ABA DIVISION FOR 
COMM. & MEDIA REL. (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.abanow.org/2013/03/aba-releases-class-of-
2012-law-graduate-employment-data/. 
 98.  See, e.g., IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, supra note 88, at 14 (noting that the median 
starting salary of the law school Class of 2011 was $60,000, which given their average debt, 
constituted “an unsustainable level of debt” which for an “increasing number of young attorneys is 
staggering”). 
 99.  See Issac Bowers, Explore the Role of Underemployment in the Student Debt Crisis, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 13, 2013) http://www.usnews.com/education/blogs/student-loan-
ranger/2013/03/13/explore-the-role-of-underemployment-in-the-student-debt-crisis (noting that the 
“inevitable result” of the rise in law school graduate indebtedness “has been a spike in . . . 
defaults”); cf. Jonathan Noble Edel, The Phyrric Victory of American Higher Education: Bubbles, 
Lemons, and Revolutions, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1543, 1560 (2013) (predicting increased default 
rate on federal student loans when the gap between salary earned and debt owed rises).  The extent 
to which this will occur, however, remains in doubt. 
  Unraveling the degree to which there will be a default crisis is a difficult task.  First, 
student loans may come from both public, typically the federal government, and private lenders.  
Financial Aid: An Overview, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, http://www.lsac.org/jd/financing-
law-school/financial-aid-overview (last visited June 5, 2013).  For federal loans, a variety of 
vehicles are available to accommodate an individual who cannot meet the loan payment, including 
pay as you earn programs, income-based repayment, and hardship accommodations, among others.  
See Repay Your Loans, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans (last visited 
June 5, 2013).  Further, federal borrowers are assigned to federal loan servicers, who arguably could 
help student-loan debtors enter into affordable payment schemes, or forbearance if that is not 
possible, to avoid defaults.  See Understanding Repayment: Loan Servicers, FEDERAL STUDENT 
AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/repay-loans/understand/servicers (last visited June 5, 2013).  These 
sorts of protections, if available at all, typically are not as robust with private loans.  Federal Versus 
Private Loans, FEDERAL STUDENT AID, http://studentaid.ed.gov/types/loans/federal-vs-private (last 
visited June 5, 2013).  The license suspension provisions for failure to meet student loan obligations 
vary in terms of their coverage.  See IOWA CT. R. 35.21 (authorizing automatic suspension of 
license to practice law in Iowa for attorney who “defaults on an obligation owed to or collected by 
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seems an undue burden absent greater proof of a tie between default and 
fitness to practice.100 
the College Student Aid Commission” which guarantees federal loans); HAW. REV. STATS. §§ 436 
C-1, 605-1 (2008) (authorizing suspensions for defaults on or breaches of Hawaii or United States-
based student loans); N.J. CT. R. 1-20-11B (authorizing temporary suspensions for nonpayment or 
default of a state or federal direct or guaranteed educational loan); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 623.1 
(2005 & Supp. 2013) (authorizing attorney suspension after notification of default on federal loans 
guaranteed by State Regents); Tex. Sup. Ct. Order, Misc. Docket No. 96-9155 (June 18, 1996) 
(authorizing attorney suspension after notice of default on federal loans guaranteed by Texas 
Guaranteed Student Loan Corporation). 
  To the extent the license revocation provisions focus on federal loans, which afford an 
array of options to match monthly payments to ability to pay, one might assume that the chance of 
default, absent neglect or willful avoidance, would be small.  Peter Coy, The Needless Tragedy of 
Student Loan Defaults (Nov. 28, 2012), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK: MARKETS & FINANCE, 
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-11-28/the-needless-tragedy-of-student-loan-defaults 
(last visited June 11, 2013).  Nevertheless, learning about and accessing these loan modification 
programs is not an easy task.  Rachel M. Zahorsky, Loan Moans, A.B.A. J., March 2013, at 32 
(describing hurdles lawyers face in securing federal student loan modifications).  In fact, loan 
servicers who might facilitate this task often fail to do so.  As one prominent expert on student loan 
debt wrote to me, “federal loan servicing is NOT part of the reason federal default should be 
uncommon, but indeed is part of the reason that federal default is higher than it ought to be.” E-mail 
from Heather Jarvis to Arthur Greenbaum, Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law (June 17, 
2013) (on file with author); see also Ann Carrns, Keeping a Closer Eye on Student Loan Servicing 
Firms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2013), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/keeping-a-closer-
eye-on-student-loan-servicing-firms/ (last visited June 11, 2013, 12:06 EST) (noting that loan 
servicers sometimes fail to keep in timely communication with the debtor, or give inaccurate advice 
which leads to default).  To the extent there are identification or administrative errors resulting in 
defaults, statutes vary over whether they can be considered by the state supreme court or its delegee 
before suspension is entered.  Compare HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-1 (2008) (upon certification of 
student loan default, suspension “shall be entered without further review or hearing”), with IOWA 
CT. R 35.21(d) (limiting the scope of review of a lawyer student loan default suspension “to 
determining if there has been a mistake of fact relating to the attorney’s delinquency”).  These 
choices may well be a consequence of the rigor of the procedures required before the default is 
referred. 
 100.  Cf. Dennis P. Harwick, “Don’t Shoot the Messenger” The Story of the Student Loan 
Default/License Suspension Rule, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, 15 (March 1997) (noting the vehement 
objections to such a rule by the Washington Bar Association and lawyers around the state because 
the rule was unnecessary, given that substantial remedies were already available for defaults, 
“illogical,” and  improper in the face of a difficult job market).  For these and other reasons, local 
bar associations, practice-specific bars, affinity-group bars, and individuals were unanimous in their 
opposition to a proposed lawyer-suspension rule for student loan defaults in Tennessee.  Christopher 
D. Markel, et al., Comments on the Proposed Amendment to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 
Section 34 (Proposed May 18, 2009), Admin. Office of the Courts (Dec. 7, 2009-Aug. 2, 2010), 
http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (unanimously 
opposing adoption of the proposed rule). 
  A similar critique could be made about child support and tax defaults as well.  The 
correlation to fitness to practice remains strained.  However, failure to meet child support 
obligations may constitute violation of a court order and we may see that as more egregious conduct 
than mere failure to live up to a financial obligation.  Failure to pay income tax may show a serious 
disregard for the law, but that depends on the nature of the underlying conduct.  If it is criminal in 
nature, and conviction or a guilty plea results, an interim suspension is likely to be granted on a 
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This is not to say that failures to pay taxes, defaults on student 
loans, or violations of child-support orders always are irrelevant, but 
perhaps they should lead to temporary suspension only when a clear 
threat to the public from continued practice can be shown.101  Even if 
not, at least the surrounding circumstances should be considered before a 
suspension is entered.102  For example, one might want to know the 
circumstances which led to the default and the attorney’s plans to cure 
it.103 
prior finding of misconduct grounds.  See generally infra Part IV. 
 101.  See generally infra Part VI. 
 102.  States vary in terms of whether lawyers are given a chance to explain and avoid 
suspension in this area.  For example, states vary in terms of whether being in arrears in child-
support payments requires a suspension or whether other factors can be considered that might 
undercut the propriety of suspension.  Several states provide that being in arrears on child-support 
payments requires suspension without mentioning that consideration of other factors would be 
appropriate.  OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5(A)(1)(b) (authorizing suspension upon a “final and 
enforceable determination” of default under a child support order); MINN. R. LAWYERS PROF. RESP. 
R. 30(a) (authorizing suspension upon “receipt of a district court order or a report from an 
Administrative Law Judge or public authority” that lawyer “is in arrears in payment of maintenance 
or child support and has not entered into or is not in compliance with an approved payment 
agreement for such support”); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90 (2-a.b) (providing that “[t]he only issue to be 
determined as a result of the hearing [for failure to pay child-support] is whether the arrears have 
been paid.  No evidence with respect to the appropriateness of the court order or ability of the 
respondent party in arrears to comply with such order shall be received or considered by the 
disciplinary committee”).  In contrast, while Colorado allows for an administrative suspension for 
failure to pay child support, its imposition is not automatic.  COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.8.5.  Suspension 
may be avoided by showing that: 
(1) there is a mistake in the identity of the attorney; (2) there is a bona fide disagreement 
currently before a court or an agency concerning the amount of the child support debt, 
arrearage balance, retroactive support due, or the amount of the past-due child support 
when combined with maintenance; (3) all child support payments were made when due; 
(4) the attorney has complied with the subpoena or warrant; (5) the attorney was not 
served with the subpoena or warrant; or (6) there was a technical defect with the subpoe-
na or warrant.” 
Id.; accord MD. R. ON CTS., JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-778(d) (“A referral from the Child Support 
Enforcement Administration to the Attorney Grievance Commission is presumptive evidence that 
the attorney falls within the criteria specified in Code, Family Law Article, § 10-119.3 (e)(1), but 
the introduction of such evidence does not preclude Bar Counsel or the attorney from introducing 
additional evidence or otherwise showing cause why no suspension should be imposed.”).  The 
different approaches chosen may be a function of the comparative richness of the procedures 
preceding the suspension request. 
 103.  For example, at the admissions stage, jurisdictions explore financial issues as part of the 
character and fitness inquiry, but they take a holistic approach to the question.  See, e.g., In re 
Pillette, 829 So. 2d 1011 (La. 2012) (conditionally admitting applicant to practice law upon 
sufficient explanation of the details surrounding financial delinquencies and future good faith efforts 
to satisfy the obligations during one year probationary period). 
  Similarly, an isolated failure to pay taxes, in the right circumstances, will not lead to a 
denial of admission.  See, e.g., In re Scallon, 956 P.2d 982, 986-87 (Or. 1998).  In deciding to allow 
a Wisconsin lawyer’s admission to the Oregon bar, despite an isolated failure to pay taxes, the court 
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Admittedly, the referring entity may have explored these 
circumstances when attempting to reach an accommodation before 
referral,104 but they do so for a different purpose than to assess the 
fitness of the lawyer to continue to practice law while the debt 
remains.105  It is ultimately for the state supreme courts or their delegees 
extensively explained its reasoning: 
  Applicant always has filed income tax returns and acknowledged the taxes that he 
owed.  For the most part, he has paid them.  He himself has acknowledged that, when he 
failed to pay his taxes, his failures were his own doing and responsibility.  Applicant has 
made at least small inroads on his tax obligations during even financially limiting cir-
cumstances and has held out the hope that he could satisfy all the obligations in full 
when he received his share of the attorney fee for the case in which he had been involved 
in Wisconsin.  As we have noted, supplemental information shows that he has fulfilled 
that hope. 
  We think that the following statement — also by the opposing half [of the state 
Board of Bar Examiners] — better sums up this case and the factors that we find most 
pertinent: 
“This is a close case and a difficult decision.  Several practitioners and judges have at-
tested to Applicant’s good moral character, and have lauded Applicant’s skill and integ-
rity in the practice of law.  There is no evidence that Applicant has committed fraud, de-
ceit, or any crimes of moral turpitude.  There is no evidence that Applicant has ever 
cheated a client nor that Applicant’s handling of his financial affairs has ever left a client 
shortchanged.” 
  We agree with that description of the record.  We understand it to mean that the op-
posing half accepts as a general proposition that applicant is a person of good moral 
character, subject only to a lingering doubt as to whether he was wholly committed to 
satisfying his tax obligation.  As noted, applicant’s actions now have laid that issue to 
rest.  The opposing half’s surviving concern consists of doubts that applicant has demon-
strated his fitness to practice law. 
  For our part, we are satisfied on that score, as well.  Applicant appears always to 
have had his clients’ best interests in mind, so much so that he stopped practicing law at 
a time when he no longer felt fit to represent those clients adequately.  No issues have 
been raised concerning his competence.  That demonstrates to us that applicant has had, 
and continues to have, the fitness to appreciate and to engage in the practice of law. 
  It also appears to us that applicant understands and appreciates the reasons that led 
to his past financial difficulties, is determined to avoid their repetition, and is capable of 
carrying out that determination.  In that regard, applicant is willing to accept the recom-
mendation of the favoring half that he be admitted conditionally. 
In re Scallon, 956 P.2d at 986-87. 
 104.  See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-1 (2008) (incorporating by reference section 436C-3 
which predicates suspension for student loan default on prior district court finding of default and 
ability to pay without hardship); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 623.1(B) (2005 & Supp. 2013) (allowing 
State Regents to consider “hardship circumstances” before referring student loan default to licensing 
authority for possible license suspension). 
 105.  Process concerns also may arise.  The nature of the hearing provided, the qualifications of 
the fact finder, and the standard of proof required may make the decisions some entities reach 
subject to question.  See, e.g., Letter from Russell W. Savory to Michael W. Catalano, Clerk of the 
Tennessee Supreme Court (Feb. 22, 2010), http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-
proposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (bankruptcy and debtor-creditor attorney commenting on a 
proposed lawyer student loan default suspension rule in Tennessee on the need for appropriate 
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to reach this decision.106 
Requiring the state courts to determine in each case whether a 
default should lead to suspension, rather than simply ordering 
suspension upon notification of default, admittedly has resource 
implications, but they may be overstated.  To the extent a jurisdiction 
determines that default on certain obligations most often requires 
suspension, I would make the issuance of suspension presumptive upon 
notice of the default being given by the appropriate entity to the court, or 
its designated agent.  The burden would then fall on the lawyer to show 
cause why the suspension should not go into effect.  Those without a 
colorable excuse often would not contest the suspension’s entrance. 
Finally, the costs of these suspensions need to be considered.  As 
noted previously, any suspension has costs for the lawyer involved, his 
clients, his family, other lawyers and their clients, and the system.107  A 
suspension for failure to pay a financial obligation has additional costs 
beyond the suspension itself.  If failure to pay is a function of present 
inability to do so, suspension, which may take away one’s sole 
livelihood, is likely to exacerbate the non-payment problem, not improve 
it, as it only makes satisfying the obligation more difficult.108  Further, 
while the threat of suspension upon default may promote compliance 
with this obligation, it may force lawyers to forgo other obligations in 
prioritizing their debt.  To the extent the threat of suspension is for 
default on a student loan, which typically is not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, lawyers may be forced into bankruptcy to get relief from 
their other debts so that they can pay their student loans and keep their 
licenses.109  Finally, such a provision is likely to have a disproportionate 
administrative procedures before referral and meaningful opportunity to appear before the state 
supreme court before entrance of a suspension); Rickey E. Wilkins, on behalf of the Memphis Bar 
Association, to Mike Catalano, Appellate Court Clerk, at 2 (March 1, 2010), 
http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (complaining 
about the lack of procedural protections in proposed lawyer student loan default suspension rule in 
Tennessee). 
 106.  See, e.g., Rickey E. Wilkins, on behalf of the Memphis Bar Association, to Mike 
Catalano, Appellate Court Clerk, at 2 (March 1, 2010), 
http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendments-sc-rule-9 (raising this 
concern in opposition to a proposed student loan default suspension rule in Tennessee). 
 107.  See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 108.  John Jurco, Comment, Ohio’s Government Bar Rule V: Innovation or Derogation?, 30 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 119, 136 (2004); cf. Disciplinary Counsel v. Redfield, 878 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Ohio 
2007) (noting the difficulty loss of a law license had on respondent’s ability to pay child support 
arrearage and have the suspension lifted).  That said, I do not want to overstate this point.  The 
deterrent effect the threat of suspension has on defaults might outweigh the costs imposed in 
individual cases where the default becomes more difficult to cure. 
 109.  See, e.g., Wilkins, supra note 105 (raising this concern in opposition to a proposed 
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impact on law students from low-income families, often minorities, who 
often leave school with larger debt110 and those with debt in private 
practice who serve low-income clients.111  These are unintended 
consequences that should be avoided. 
Absent a clear correlation between these defaults and potential 
harm to clients, using suspension in this way seems suspect.  Unless 
carefully cabined, the lawyer-disciplinary process may be hijacked by 
such requirements to meet concerns insufficiently related to fitness to 
practice and protection of the public from unethical lawyer conduct, the 
proper focus of the disciplinary process.112  But even if one concludes 
that such conduct raises a red flag about a lawyer’s fitness to practice, 
the lawyer should at least be given the opportunity to rebut those 
concerns before suspension is entered. 
IV. SUSPENSIONS PREMISED ON A PRIOR FINDING OF MISCONDUCT113 
Yet another set of interim suspensions is authorized for lawyer 
misconduct discovered in another setting.  Both discipline in another 
jurisdiction114 and conviction of or a finding of guilt for a serious 
criminal offense115 may trigger disciplinary actions.116  In either case, 
lawyer student loan default suspension rule in Tennessee). 
 110.  See, e.g., CREOLA JOHNSON, IS A LAW DEGREE STILL WORTH THE PRICE?: IT DEPENDS 
ON WHAT THE LAW SCHOOL HAS TO OFFER YOU 254-57 (2013); IMPACT OF LAW SCHOOL DEBT, 
supra note 88, at 25-26 (noting that “blacks and Hispanics are significantly more likely to leave law 
school with debt than whites, and their debt loads tend to be larger”). 
 111.  See, e.g., Letter from Brent Heilig, an attorney, to Michael W. Catalano, Appellate Court 
Clerk (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.tncourts.gov/rules/proposed/comments-proposed-amendments-
sc-rule-9 (noting, in a comment filed in opposition to a proposed student loan default suspension 
rule in Tennessee, that lawyers representing poor clients may have difficulty getting paid which 
might lead to an increased chance of student loan default). 
 112.  Cf. Harris, supra note 80, at 16 (worrying that providing for license suspensions for 
student loan defaults may just be “bowing to public pressure” and providing “a powerful collection 
tool” for student loan agencies which is not the focus of the lawyer disciplinary process). 
 113.  The preceding section also involved prior findings of misconduct, there default on 
specified financial obligations.  I nevertheless have chosen to treat these sections differently.  The 
former is driven in large part by a collections rationale without a clear link to fitness to practice.  
The suspensions treated here, for disciplinary sanctions imposed by another jurisdiction, or for a 
conviction of or guilty plea to a serious crime, are more clearly associated with fitness concerns.  
The proceedings underlying the prior finding of misconduct also may create more confidence in the 
prior determination reached than with financial default suspensions. 
 114.  See infra text accompanying notes 117-33. 
 115.  See infra text accompanying notes 134-43. 
 116.  For a discussion of the duty to report these matters to disciplinary counsel, as well as 
some suggestions on how to draft appropriate language to implement them, see Arthur F. 
Greenbaum, The Automatic Reporting of Lawyer Misconduct to Disciplinary Authorities: Filling the 
Reporting Gap, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 486–99 (2012).  Portions of this section are adapted from that 
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interim suspensions are sometimes used while the court determines what 
final disciplinary sanction to impose.  My focus, here, is on the role, if 
any, interim suspensions should play in this process.  I conclude that 
interim suspensions for reciprocal discipline often are not necessary 
since the reciprocal discipline process is itself quite streamlined, making 
an interim protective act (interim suspension) largely superfluous.  As to 
interim suspensions for criminal misconduct, I conclude that the use of 
interim suspensions seems well justified in the usual case and flexibility 
remains to forgo interim suspensions when they are not. 
The first situation is captured in the concept of reciprocal 
discipline.117  Under this concept, the discipline of a lawyer in one 
jurisdiction will be looked to by other jurisdictions in which the lawyer 
is licensed or otherwise permitted to practice.118  The second jurisdiction 
automatically imposes the same sanction as the first, unless the lawyer 
can show cause why that should not be the case.  For example, suppose 
Lawyer A is licensed to practice in Ohio and Michigan.  If Michigan 
found A to have violated his ethical responsibilities in a situation that 
warranted disbarment, Ohio would, in the usual case, follow suit.119  
Only in that way could the true impact of the initial punishment be felt 
— the lawyer would not be able to practice.  Carrying over the sanction 
from another jurisdiction, in the usual case, protects potential clients 
from “a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit.”120  It 
also avoids the unseemly situation of a lawyer found unfit in one 
jurisdiction being deemed good enough in another, which may 
undermine the public’s confidence in the profession and the 
administration of justice.121  Most states allow exceptions under certain 
article. 
 117.  The ABA promoted the idea of reciprocal discipline more than forty years ago.  See 
SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AM. BAR ASS’N, PROBLEMS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 116–21 (June 1970) [hereinafter CLARK 
REPORT], available at http:// www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/reports/Clark_ 
Report.authcheckdam.pdf.  It called again for its adoption in a major report in the early 1990s on 
lawyer discipline.  See AM. BAR ASS’N, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY: REPORT OF 
THE COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 56 (1992) [hereinafter MCKAY 
REPORT].  Reciprocal discipline remains a recommended disciplinary procedure.  See MODEL 
RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 22 [hereinafter MRLDE].  It has been 
adopted in some form in most, if not all, jurisdictions. 
 118.  The rule may also include giving reciprocal effect to a transfer of a lawyer to inactive 
status due to a disability.  See, e.g., MRLDE R. 22(A).  Resignations in the face of disciplinary 
charges may be given reciprocal effect as well.  See, e.g., MD. R. ON CTS., JUDGES & ATTYS. 16-
773(d). 
 119.  OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § (11)(F). 
 120.  See MRLDE R. 22 cmt.; see also CLARK REPORT, supra note 117, at 117. 
 121.  See MRLDE R. 22 cmt.; see also CLARK REPORT, supra note 117, at 117. 
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circumstances, however, such as where the underlying conduct warrants 
substantially different discipline in the second state than the first,122 the 
original proceedings were so deficient as to constitute a denial of due 
process,123 or the proof in the original action was so insufficient that 
reciprocal discipline would be inappropriate.124 
While the general concept of reciprocal discipline is well 
established and widely adopted in some form in the states, there appears 
to be some divergence over whether interim suspensions play a role in 
this process.  In the MRLDE125 and in many states,126 interim suspension 
is not provided for in their reciprocal discipline rules,127 presumably 
because it is not needed.  The disciplinary process for reciprocal 
discipline is already a stream-lined one.128  The finding of misconduct 
 122.  See, e.g., ALA. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 25(d)(3); ALASKA BAR R. 27(c)(4); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 6049.1(b)(1) (West 2003); COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.21(d)(4); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 2.15(c)(4); ILL. 
SUP. CT. R. 763; IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 28(c)(4); IOWA CT. R. 35.19(3)(c); R. DISCIPL. MISS. 
STATE BAR 13; NEV. SUP. CT. R. 114(4)(c); N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(12)(d)(3); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-
14(a)(4)(E); N.M. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. 17-210(D)(4); OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 11(F)(4)(a)(ii); S.C. 
APP. CT. R. 413(29)(d)(4); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-74(3) (2011); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 
17.4(c); TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 9.04(D); UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 14-522(d)(3); WASH. R. ENF. 
LAWYER COND. 9.2(e)(1)(D). 
 123.  See, e.g., ALA. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 25(d)(1); ALASKA BAR R. 27(c)(1); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 6049.1(b)(3); COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.21(d)(1); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 2.15(c)(1); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 
763; IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 28(c)(1); IOWA CT. R. 35.19(3)(a); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 114(4)(a); 
N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(12)(d)(1); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-14(a)(4)(D); N.M. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. 17-210(D)(1); 
S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(29)(d)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-74(1); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 17.4(a); 
TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 9.04(A); UTAH R. JUD. ADMIN. 14-522(d)(1); WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER 
COND. 9.2(e)(1)(A). 
 124.  See, e.g., ALA. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 25(d)(2); ALASKA BAR R. 27(c)(2); CAL. BUS. & PROF. 
CODE § 6049.1(b)(2); COLO. R. CIV. P.  251.21(d)(2); HAW. SUP. CT. R. 2.15 (c)(2); IND. ADM. & 
DISCIPL. R. 23 § 28(c)(2); IOWA CT. R. 35.19(3)(b); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 114(4)(b); N.M. R. GOV’G 
DISCIPL. 17-210(D)(2); S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(29)(d)(2); S.D.  CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-74(2); TENN.  
SUP.  CT.  R.  9 § 17.4; TEX.  R.  DISCIPL.  PROC.  9.04(B); WASH.  R.  ENF. LAWYER COND. 
9.2(e)(1)(B). 
 125.  MRLDE R. 22. 
 126. See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 251.21; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 763; N.J. CT. R. 1:20-14(a); OHIO 
GOV. BAR R. V § 11(F); PA. R. DISCIPL. ENF. 216; TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 9.01; WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
22.22. 
 127.  This does not mean that the underlying conduct will not trigger interim suspensions in 
those states under another theory, such as threat of harm, but only that it is not expressly integrated 
into their reciprocal discipline schemes. 
 128.  This is implicit in the reciprocal discipline system, as reflected in this comment to Rule 
22 of the MRLDE: 
If a lawyer suspended or disbarred in one jurisdiction is also admitted in another jurisdic-
tion and no action can be taken against the lawyer until a new disciplinary proceeding is 
instituted, tried, and concluded, the public in the second jurisdiction is left unprotected 
against a lawyer who has been judicially determined to be unfit.  Any procedure which 
so exposes innocent clients to harm cannot be justified.  The spectacle of a lawyer dis-
barred in one jurisdiction yet permitted to practice elsewhere exposes the profession to 
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has already been found in the other state’s disciplinary proceeding and is 
treated as conclusive,129 unless one of the limited exceptions applies.130  
Often the jurisdiction is able to impose identical discipline without 
challenge by the respondent.  While these rules give respondents a 
limited ability to attack the underlying finding of discipline,131 I suspect 
this happens rarely.  In short, with a swift and easy process already in 
place, little time is saved, and public protection provided, by adding 
interim suspensions to the process. 
Other jurisdictions do provide for the possibility of imposing an 
interim suspension in the reciprocal discipline context while the 
proceedings to impose final discipline are pending.132  Given the 
analysis above, this remedy may be seldom sought, but it remains 
available in special cases where the underlying conduct poses such a 
threat that immediate action is warranted.133 
Conviction of, or a finding of guilt134 to a criminal offense135 also 
criticism and undermines public confidence in the administration of justice. 
MRLDE R. 22 cmt.  It is in response to this concern that the stream-lined procedure was adopted. 
 129.  See, e.g., MRLDE R. 22(E) (“a final adjudication in another jurisdiction that a lawyer, 
whether or not admitted in that jurisdiction, has been guilty of misconduct or should be transferred 
to disability inactive status shall establish conclusively the misconduct or the disability for purposes 
of a disciplinary or disability proceeding in this jurisdiction”). 
 130.  See supra text accompanying notes 122-24. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  See, e.g., R. GOV. D.C. BAR  XI § 11(d) (authorizing interim suspension of lawyers 
suspended or disbarred in another jurisdiction pending imposition of reciprocal discipline); MD. R. 
ON CTS., JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-773(d) (allowing interim suspension pending further order of a court 
in another jurisdiction where lawyer has been “disbarred or is currently suspended from practice by 
final order”); U.S. DIST. CT. R. N.D. CAL., CIVIL LOCAL R. 11-7. 
 133.  Even without authority directly in the reciprocal discipline rule, disciplinary authorities 
may reach the same result by seeking a threat of public harm suspension.  See generally infra Part 
VI. 
 134.  While the original MRLDE provision based suspension on a lawyer’s “conviction” of a 
serious crime.  The rule was amended in 1999 substituting the phrase a “finding of guilt.”  The 
change arose from a recognition that “there can be significant delay between a finding of guilt and 
the entry of a judgment of conviction, often attributable to presentence investigations and the 
sentencing process.  The rule change [was] designed ‘to protect the public and to uphold the honor 
of the profession’ when a lawyer has been found guilty but has not yet been convicted. . . .” ABA 
Delegates Tackle Lawyer Discipline, Defer Action on Law Firm and MDP Issues, LAWS. MAN. ON 
PROF. CONDUCT ONLINE (ABA/BNA), 1999 WL 94186 (Feb. 17, 1999). 
  States vary on the terms of the disposition required before an order of interim suspension 
will be entered.  For example, some states require “conviction” of a crime.  See, e.g., CONN. R. 
SUPER. CT. § 2-41(e); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 510(a); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761(b); ME. BAR R. 
7.3(d)(1); MICH. CT. R. 9.120(B)(1); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC.3:18(d).  Other states 
require that an attorney have been “found guilty” before imposing an interim suspension.  See, e.g., 
IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 11.1(a).  Others call for an interim suspension when either conviction 
or a finding of guilt occurs.  See, e.g., VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6, § IV, ¶ 13-22(A); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 
22.20(1).  That said, the dichotomy between “conviction” and a finding of “guilt” may not be as 
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strong as it appears.  For example, Nevada provides for interim suspension upon conviction, but 
defines that term quite broadly to include “a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, a plea under North 
Carolina v. Alford, or a guilty verdict following either a bench or a jury trial.” See NEV. SUP. CT. R. 
111(1).  Nevertheless, disputes still arise over whether a particular act constitutes a finding of guilt 
or a conviction.  See, e.g., Miss. Bar v. Shelton, 855 So. 2d 444 (Miss. 2003) (majority holding, over 
strong dissent, that a conditional guilty plea is a guilty plea or conviction triggering suspension).  
Finally, certain states explicitly state that interim suspensions are to be imposed on conviction 
regardless of whether an appeal or other challenge to the conviction is pending.  See, e.g., ME. BAR 
R. 7.3(d)(1); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 111(7); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC. 3:18(d).  See generally 
E.W.H., What Amounts to Conviction or Satisfies Requirement as to Showing of Conviction, within 
Statute Making Conviction a Ground for Refusing to Grant or for Canceling License or Special 
Privilege, 113 A.L.R. 1179 (1938 & Cum. Supp.). 
 135.  There is generally more uniformity in the types of offenses that trigger an automatic 
interim suspension.  Most often, states require that an attorney be convicted or found guilty of a 
“serious crime.”  See, e.g., CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-41(e); IDAHO BAR COMM’N R. 510(a)(1); MD. 
R. on CTS., JUDGES, & ATTYS. 16-771(c); NEB. SUP. CT. R. § 3-312(A); NEV. SUP. CT. R. 111(7); 
WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.20(5).  A typical definition of “serious crime” includes: 
any felony or any lesser crime that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustwor-
thiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, or any crime a necessary element of 
which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of the crime, involves 
interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt, conspiracy or solicita-
tion of another to commit a “serious crime.” 
MRLDE R. 19(C); see also CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-41(c) (“The term ‘serious crime’ . . .  
[includes] any felony or any larceny as defined in the jurisdiction in which the attorney was 
convicted or any crime for which the attorney was sentenced to a term of incarceration or for which 
a suspended period of incarceration or a period of probation was imposed.”).  Even states whose 
interim suspension provision is triggered by an offense other than a “serious crime” often track the 
concepts within the MRLDE’s definition.  For example, Virginia’s interim suspension provision is 
triggered by conviction of a “crime,” which it defines as including a felony conviction, any “offense 
involving theft, fraud, forgery, extortion, bribery, or perjury,” or any “attempt, solicitation or 
conspiracy to commit” such offenses.  VA. SUP. CT. R. Pt. 6, § IV, ¶ 13-1.  Similarly, California 
mandates the suspension of an attorney until the time for appeal has elapsed if “the crime of which 
the attorney was convicted involved . . . moral turpitude or is a felony under the laws of California, 
the United States, or any state or territory thereof.”  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6102(a) (West 2003 
& Supp. 2012). 
  Interestingly, some states require an attorney to report a conviction of any crime, 
regardless of how minor, while reserving an interim suspension for more serious criminal 
convictions.  Compare IND. ADM. & DISCIPL. R. 23 § 11.1(a)(2) (requiring an attorney to report a 
finding of guilt of any crime under the laws of Indiana or the United States), with IND. ADM. & 
DISCIPL. R. 23 § 11.1(a) (authorizing an interim suspension upon a finding that the attorney has 
been “found guilty of a crime punishable as a felony”);  see also ME. BAR R.  7.3(d)(1), (d)(6) 
(requiring an attorney to report a conviction of any crime, but reserving automatic suspension for a 
crime demonstrating “unfitness to engage in the practice of law”); MICH. CT  R. 9.120(A)(1), (B)(1) 
(requiring an attorney to report a conviction of any crime, but automatically suspending an attorney 
only upon proof of conviction of a felony).  The apparent justification for this divergence is twofold.  
First, an “any crime” reporting rule simplifies the reporting duty.  The lawyer need not make the 
sometimes difficult determination of whether the nature of his crime makes it a “serious” one.  Cf. 
Greenbaum, supra note 116, at 496–97.  That determination is left to those in the disciplinary 
system.  Second, the divergence is a recognition that, while in the usual case, the damage to the 
lawyer’s reputation and the inconvenience to the lawyer’s clients accompanying an interim 
suspension can only be justified when the underlying criminal offense is serious, nevertheless, 
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can lead to an interim suspension pending a final determination of 
whether the criminal activity warrants disciplinary sanction as well.136  
The idea behind interim suspensions, in this context, is that conviction of 
a crime of sufficient magnitude calls into question whether the lawyer 
has the character to deal honestly with clients and to serve them loyally 
in their representations.137  It also is a nod to the reality that the 
punishment associated with these crimes may, as a practical matter, 
impede the lawyer’s ability to handle matters competently and 
diligently.138  Maintaining public confidence in lawyers and the 
disciplinary system also is served by taking immediate action against 
lawyer/criminals.139  While the interim suspension is in place, authorities 
then determine what, if any, final disciplinary action is appropriate.140 
That said, the interim suspension usually is not automatic and may, 
at times, be stayed for good cause.141  In In re Downey, for example, an 
knowledge of the commission of the lesser crime, when coupled with other factors, might still 
justify a public harm suspension or the imposition of a final disciplinary sanction. 
 136.  The ABA began promoting the idea of interim suspensions for criminal convictions of 
serious crimes more than forty years ago.  See CLARK REPORT, supra note 117, at 122–30.  It called 
again for the adoption of such interim suspension rules in a major report in the early 1990s on 
lawyer discipline.  See MCKAY REPORT, supra note 117, at 56.  Interim suspensions for criminal 
convictions of serious crimes remain a recommended disciplinary procedure.  See MRLDE R. 
19(D).  For examples of such suspensions see In re Schwartz, 931 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 2010) (interim 
suspension based on felony conviction) and In re Minor, 958 So. 2d 675 (La. 2007) (interim 
suspension based upon his conviction of a serious crime).  For an interesting discussion of whether 
these provisions should be applied to convictions from a foreign country, see In re Wilde, 68 A.3d 
749 (D.C. 2013). 
 137.  Fear also has been expressed that lawyers knowing they face imprisonment and probable 
loss of license will be more likely to exploit current clients for their own gain.  See CLARK REPORT, 
supra note 117, at 125.  Even if they would not, other lawyers who know of the criminal conduct 
may be reluctant to deal with the convicted lawyer, which, in turn, will undercut that lawyer’s 
ability to represent existing clients.  Id. 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  As the Clark Report found, “[n]o single facet of disciplinary enforcement is more to 
blame for any lack of public confidence in the integrity of the bar than the policy that permits a 
convicted attorney to continue to practice while apparently enjoying immunity from discipline.”  Id. 
at 124; accord MRLDE R. 19(D) cmt.  For a spirited debate among the judges on whether the 
maintenance of public confidence is properly considered in deciding whether to impose an interim 
suspension for a guilty plea or conviction of a serious crime see Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Protokowicz, 607 A.2d 33 (Md. 1992). 
 140.  The conduct underlying a criminal conviction also may warrant disciplinary sanction in 
its own right.  This is seen most clearly in Rule 8.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which prohibits “commit[ing] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, 
trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” It should be recognized that this rule does 
not speak to all criminal acts of a lawyer, but only those that reflect adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice.  Mere crimes of moral turpitude that do not implicate 
these factors are not covered by this rule.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) cmt. [2]. 
 141.  The rules authorizing interim suspensions in this context, while phrased differently, 
almost always leave the court or its delegee some discretion in terms of whether an interim 
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interim suspension of a lawyer who had been convicted of engaging in 
the business of money transmission without a license, a serious crime, 
was stayed.  The court reasoned: 
Applying these considerations, we conclude that respondent has shown 
good cause for the court to stay the interim suspension.  His prior un-
blemished record as an attorney; his plea of guilty to what amounts to a 
strict liability offense involving no scienter or moral turpitude; and the 
fact that his violation arose from conduct outside of his normal legal 
practice all suggest a very low degree of risk that permitting him to 
practice in the interim will harm the public.  For the same reasons, but 
subject of course to development of a factual record in the disciplinary 
process, we think that the likelihood that respondent will receive a sig-
nificant sanction, i.e., a suspension (if at all) of more than brief dura-
tion, is very small.  Stated differently, there is a reasonable possibility 
on this record that interim suspension might exceed the sanction that 
will eventually be imposed on respondent.  Considering, finally, the 
harm to respondent’s livelihood and ability to support his family that 
interim suspension may entail, we conclude that respondent has met 
his burden to show good cause for why the court should stay its 
hand.142 
suspension should be entered.  The MRLDE is among the more stringent, requiring that the lawyer 
“shall” be suspended, but that the suspension may be terminated “in the interest of justice . . . upon a 
showing of extraordinary circumstances.” MRLDE 19(D)(2).  Others are more generous, simply 
noting that the court or its delegee “may” enter an interim suspension on these grounds.  See, e.g., 
CONN. R. SUPER. CT. § 2-41(e); IDAHO BAR. COMM’N R. 510(a)(1); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 761(b).  In 
contrast, a few seem to make imposition of the interim suspension mandatory.  See, e.g., MISS. ST. 
BAR R. OF DISCIP. 6(a).  For a discussion of the factors to be considered in exercising this discretion, 
see Chief Disciplinary Counselor v. Briggs, No. HHDCV 1360400635, 2013 WL 3970785 (Conn. 
Super. Ct., July 18, 2013). 
 142.  In re Downey, 960 A.2d 1135, 1137 (D.C. 2008), opinion amended on reh’g, 975 A.2d 
152 (D.C. 2009).  Maryland reached the same conclusion.  Att’y Grievance Comm. v. Downey, 990 
A.2d 1070 (Md. 2010); see also In re Respondent M, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 465 (Review Dep’t 
1993) (finding  good cause not to impose an interim suspension for driving under the influence 
causing an injury, a felony, in part because the ultimate disciplinary sanction, if entered, would be 
less severe than the interim suspension given the time it would take to reach a final disposition); In 
re Grillo, 960 N.Y.S.2d 689 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (setting aside interim suspension for criminal 
conviction for good cause, applying N.Y. Jud. Law § 90(4)(f)); Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. 
Protokowicz, 607 A.2d 33, 35 (Md. 1992) (noting that rule, then in force, permitted but did not 
require the imposition of an interim suspension for criminal conviction); cf. State v. Kirsch, No. CR 
980178336, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2567 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2000) (upholding interim 
suspension pending appeal for felony convictions resulting from a fatal automobile collision which 
the defendant caused while driving drunk, but modifying it to allow non-court practice by 
respondent if clients are notified about the criminal convictions, acknowledge notification in 
writing, and waive conflicts, if any, associated with the conviction); see also Order of Temporary 
Suspension and Referral to Disciplinary Board at 38, In re Whittemore, No. 64154 (Nev. Oct. 8, 
2013) (Hardesty, J. concurring in part and dissenting) (arguing that lawyer, presently under an 
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As to the collateral effects of such a suspension, at least in Ohio, an 
interim suspension for a felony does not constitute a prior disciplinary 
offense, and thus does not serve as an aggravating factor in other 
disciplinary matters.143  Depending on the circumstances, credit may be 
given for the time served on interim suspension if a final suspension for 
the underlying conduct is ordered.144 
A more difficult question is how to respond where a lawyer has 
simply been indicted for a serious crime.  Should interim suspensions be 
entered there as well?145  Several states have a specific rule dealing with 
this situation, although they vary on whether the imposition of an 
interim suspension is mandatory or permissive.146  Others find 
indictment a factor which, when coupled with the nature of the 
underlying charges, might warrant a public harm suspension.147  Note 
that, in the latter case, the mere fact of indictment is not enough, a threat 
interim suspension pending appeal of a felony conviction, should be allowed, under all the 
circumstances, to continue to represent his current clients outside of state court proceedings). 
 143.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Peterson, 984 N.E.2d 1035, 1038 (Ohio 2012) (“‘Our precedent 
indicates that a prior interim felony suspension has not heretofore been considered as a prior 
disciplinary offense.’”); see also In re Maxwell, 44 So. 3d 668, 675 n.12 (La. 2010) (noting that an 
interim felony conviction does not constitute prior discipline when considering mitigating and 
aggravating factors). 
 144.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger, 929 N.E.2d 410, 415 (Ohio 2010) 
(comparing and contrasting cases differing on whether to give credit for an interim suspension when 
imposing final discipline based on the commission of a crime by the lawyers involved); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Margolis, 870 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ohio 2007) (discussing the differing approaches 
taken and concluding that where the magnitude of the misconduct is large and compelling evidence 
of contrition is lacking, credit for an interim suspension is inappropriate). 
 145.  The focus here is on whether the state should impose interim suspensions premised on 
indictment of a crime.  It should be noted that where the facts underlying the crime also implicate an 
ongoing disciplinary proceeding, the lawyer may desire that the disciplinary proceeding be delayed 
until the criminal case concludes in order to best preserve constitutional rights.  At times, the lawyer 
may request an interim suspension be imposed, presumably to procure agreement to postpone the 
disciplinary proceeding.  See, e.g., In re Galette, 737 S.E.2d 691 (Ga. 2013). 
 146.  Compare OKLA. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. PROC. 7.3 (providing that “[u]pon receipt of the 
certified copies of . . . indictment . . . the Supreme Court shall by order immediately suspend the 
lawyer from the practice of law until further order of the Court”) (emphasis added), with ILL. SUP. 
CT. R. 774(a) (providing that court “may suspend” lawyer “during the pendency of a criminal 
indictment”) (emphasis added), and N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(9)(i) (allowing but not requiring 
suspension upon indictment), and S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(17) (providing that court “may place a 
lawyer on interim suspension upon notice of the filing of an indictment, information, or complaint 
charging the lawyer with a serious crime.”) (emphasis added). 
 147.  See, e.g., In re Perkins, 807 N.E.2d 44, 45 (Ind. 2004) (finding public harm suspension 
appropriate where lawyer was charged with insurance fraud and drug dealing and could not make 
bail, leaving approximately 100 pending client matters unattended); see also N.M. R. GOV’G 
DISCIPL. 17-207A(5)(c) (providing for interim suspension upon indictment where “continued 
practice of law by an attorney will result in a substantial probability of harm, loss or damage to the 
public”).  See generally infra text accompanying notes 232-34. 
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of public harm must be established as well.148 
Thus, it appears that most jurisdictions do not require automatic 
interim suspension upon indictment.  This is appropriate.  Unlike the 
situation involving conviction or a finding of guilt, where misconduct is 
established by the criminal proceeding, no final determination that the 
lawyer, in fact, engaged in the criminal conduct has been made.  
Therefore, an investigation into that matter should be required to 
determine if the suspension is warranted.149 
As for the costs interim suspensions impose, they seem justified, at 
least in situations involving a former finding of serious discipline or 
conviction of a serious crime.  In these instances the likelihood of final 
discipline for the underlying conduct is strong.  If a disciplinary 
suspension or disbarment is the likely end result of the disciplinary 
process in any event, the imposition of an interim suspension will have 
only a marginally larger impact, moving the suspension up in time, than 
the ultimate sanction itself. 
V. DISCIPLINARY PROCESS SUSPENSIONS 
Several types of interim suspensions arise out of the disciplinary 
process itself.  Some flow from a lawyer’s failure to respond to requests 
made in the disciplinary process.150  For example, failure to respond to a 
 148.  See, e.g., In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (Mass. 1997) (noting that “indictment does 
not alone justify [an interim suspension]” but that taken with other evidence may justify a threat of 
harm suspension). 
 149.  See, e.g., In re Monteiro, 684 P.2d 506, 507 (Nev. 1984) (invoking the presumption of 
innocence and finding that indictment for a serious crime, without more, does not show a sufficient 
threat of harm to warrant interim suspension).  That does not mean that a pre-suspension hearing 
need be had if the suspension is of delayed effect and the lawyer has a right to request a hearing 
during that time.  See, e.g., Burleigh v. State Bar of Nev., 643 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Nev. 1982). 
Further, continued practice by a lawyer who is under indictment, but has not yet been allowed to put 
on a defense, may not have the same negative effect on public confidence as continued practice by 
an attorney who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a serious crime, one of the traditional 
justifications for suspensions in this area.  See supra note 139; cf. Jeremy S.  David, Case Comment, 
Constitutional Law—Presumed Innocent Until Proven Guilty?: Extending the Grounds for 
Temporary Suspension of Attorneys — In Re Ellis, 425 Mass. 332, 680 N.E.2d 1154 (1997), 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 349, 358 (1998) (asserting this basic position).  Nevertheless if the charges 
themselves are sufficiently serious, public confidence might indeed be eroded.  See, e.g., Burleigh, 
643 P.2d at 1204 (determining that “continued practice with serious charges [here attempted murder 
and arson] leveled against [the indicted lawyer] would erode public confidence in the legal 
profession”). 
 150.  See, e.g., S.C. APP. CT. R. 502(17)(c) (lawyer who has failed “to fully respond to a notice 
of investigation, has failed to fully comply with a proper subpoena issued in connection with an 
investigation or formal charges, has failed to appear at and fully respond to inquiries at an 
appearance required . . . or has failed to respond to inquiries or directives of the Commission or the 
Supreme Court,” is subject to interim suspension).  TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3 (allowing for the 
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grievance,151 provide requested documentation,152 file responsive 
pleadings, or attend a scheduled proceeding,153 all can lead to an 
immediate suspension.  So, too, can failure to follow orders issued by 
the adjudicatory authority.154  Noncooperation in a proceeding 
concerning the mental and physical capacity of a lawyer to remain in 
active practice also can lead to an interim suspension.155  Some states do 
not treat disciplinary process suspensions separately, but make them 
another basis for proving a public harm suspension is warranted.156  My 
entrance of a temporary suspension when a lawyer fails to respond to disciplinary officials 
“concerning a complaint of misconduct”); VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.3 
(authorizing imposition of interim suspension for failure to respond to a summons or subpoena); 
WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND. 7.2(a)(3) (permitting entrance of an interim suspension for failure to 
provide requested information or documents, or failure to respond to a subpoena, or failure to 
comply with disability proceedings). 
 151.  See, e.g., GA. R. PROF’L COND. 4-204.3 (d) (providing that “[i]n cases where the 
maximum sanction is disbarment or suspension, failure to respond by the respondent may authorize 
the Investigative Panel or subcommittee of the Panel to suspend the respondent until a response is 
filed”); see also In re Wathen, 721 S.E.2d 899, 900 (Ga. 2012) (ordering interim suspension for 
failing to respond to notice of investigation which respondent had received); In re Stewart, 934 
N.Y.S.2d 133, 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (entering interim suspension, inter alia, for failure to 
answer or contact the disciplinary body); In re Kern, 722 S.E.2d 520, 521 (S.C. 2012) (describing 
earlier action in which an interim suspension was entered, inter alia, for “failure to provide a written 
response to the investigation”). 
 152.  See, e.g., VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.3; In re Lyons, 599 N.Y.S.2d 643 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (imposing interim suspension for lawyer’s failure to produce requested 
records). 
 153.  In re Kern, 722 S.E.2d at 521 (describing earlier action in which an interim suspension 
was entered, inter alia, for failure to appear as required); In re Way, 952 N.Y.S.2d 170 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2012) (ordering interim suspension in case involving repeated delays in answering disciplinary 
complaint, failure to attend deposition in the matter, and failure to respond to requests to cure this, 
although only the failure to attend the deposition was cited as the noncooperation supporting interim 
suspension); In re Stewart, 934 N.Y.S.2d at 134 (interim suspension imposed for a number of 
reasons including failure to appear at deposition scheduled in the disciplinary process). 
 154.  VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.1. 
 155.  WYO. ST. BAR BYLAWS art. 1 § 3(i)(6) (authorizing interim suspension where lawyer in 
such an investigation fails to provide authorization for release of relevant medical records); see also 
In re Stern, 946 N.Y.S.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (interim suspension imposed, in part, for 
failure to submit to psychiatric examination to evaluate lawyer’s mental capacity). 
 156.  For example, in New York an attorney may be suspended 
from the practice of law pending consideration of charges of professional misconduct, 
upon a finding that the attorney is guilty of professional misconduct immediately threat-
ening the public interest.  Such finding may be based upon: . . .  (i) the attorney’s default 
in responding to the petition or notice, or the attorney’s failure . . .  to comply with any 
lawful demand of this court or the Departmental Disciplinary Committee made in con-
nection with any investigation. 
N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(1).  For application of this standard see, e.g., In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d 101, 
103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (entering immediate suspension for lawyers failure “to comply with the 
Committee’s lawful request for documentation, to respond to its subpoenas and to answer multiple 
complaints”); In re Bloodsaw, 926 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (ordering immediate 
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view is that suspensions for noncooperation are an important, justifiable 
tool to secure participation in the disciplinary process despite the costs 
such suspensions impose.  Disciplinary proceedings are at the heart of 
lawyer regulation which noncooperation impedes.  That said, they are 
but one of an array of tools available to police this area and a sensitive 
consideration of when these various tools should be utilized is required. 
To the extent the noncooperation is the result of the invocation of 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, it should not lead 
to an interim suspension for noncooperation.157  It may, however, if it is 
determined that the privilege does not lie.158  And, in any event, in some 
jurisdictions the tribunal may draw an adverse inference about the 
underlying conduct if the privilege is invoked.159 
Lack of cooperation need not automatically lead to an interim 
suspension.  Thus, in one case, the court refused to order an interim 
suspension for threat of harm to the public based on lack of cooperation 
where the failure to cooperate was intermittent and often was caused by 
scheduling conflicts resulting from the representation of the lawyer’s 
clients.160 
suspension where “[r]espondent has disregarded a judicial subpoena and, in the words of the 
Committee, has ‘demonstrated a strategy of silent entrenchment, a calculated refusal to 
acknowledge repeated Committee inquiries, or even submit an answer to the complaint of [the] 
Court Examiner[ ] . . . .  in the face of serious allegations, allegations implicating inter alia, tens of 
thousands of dollars intended for the care of a mentally incompetent person for whom Respondent 
was guardian’”). 
 157.  See, e.g., Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 514 (1967) (plurality opinion) (finding 
disbarment for invocation of  Fifth Amendment rights in a disciplinary proceeding 
unconstitutional); In re Kapchan, 924 N.Y.S.2d 338, 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that 
“merely invoking one’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination should not serve as a 
separate ground for an interim suspension”); cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.1 cmt. [2]. 
 158.  Cf. In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 103-04 (finding that “[a]lthough an attorney cannot be 
suspended on an interim basis solely for asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination . . . he cannot assert such a right merely to avoid production of records or documents 
which an attorney is required to maintain” and ordering an interim suspension, in part, for 
noncooperation from improper raising of the Fifth Amendment privilege.)  See generally 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Snaider, No. NNHCV116024179S, 2012 WL 1221482 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Mar. 21, 2012) (finding that IOLTA records fall within the required records exception to the Fifth 
Amendment and ordering their disclosure). 
 159.  Compare In re Redding, 269 Ga. 537, 537 (Ga. 1998)  (noting that an adverse inference 
may be drawn from a respondent’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in a disciplinary matter), and In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d at 101 (same), and State ex rel. 
Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Gasaway, 863 P.2d 1189, 1197 (Okla. 1993) (same), with Att’y Grievance 
Comm’n of Md. v. Unnamed Att’y, 467 A.2d 517, 521 (Md. 1983) (noting that no adverse inference 
may be drawn from an attorney’s refusal to testify against himself in a disciplinary proceeding), and 
In re Woll, 194 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Mich. 1972) (same). 
 160.  In re Martin, 90 So. 3d 392, 393 (La. 2012).  In declining to enter an interim suspension 
based on a need to protect against public harm, the court noted that 
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As a general matter, the threat of immediate suspension is a useful 
tool to encourage cooperation by those charged in the disciplinary 
process and to avoid the cost and delays occasioned by respondent 
neglect.161  Because this suspension flows from a failure to cooperate in 
the proceeding itself, rather than from the underlying misconduct being 
prosecuted in the disciplinary proceeding, and because the interim 
suspension can be lifted by mere compliance, if a final sanction of 
suspension is ordered,162 credit will not be given for the time the lawyer 
was under default suspension.163  Because the default suspension is 
premised on the need to exact cooperation in the underlying proceeding, 
it expires when a sanction for the underlying misconduct is reached.164  
failure to appear before the ODC was due to scheduling conflicts resulting from her need 
to appear in court on behalf of her clients.  While respondent could have made a more 
diligent effort to balance her client’s interests with her duty to cooperate with the ODC, 
we cannot say her actions were contumacious in nature, nor do they demonstrate a poten-
tial for harm to the orderly administration of the disciplinary investigation.  Therefore, 
without passing on whether respondent’s failure to cooperate rises to the level of a disci-
plinary offense, we conclude it does not constitute grounds for immediate interim sus-
pension. 
In re Martin, 90 So. 3d 392, 393 (La. 2012). 
 161. See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541, 551 
(Iowa 2012); Jerry Cohen, Appropriate Dispositions in Cases of Lawyer Misconduct, 82 MASS. L. 
REV. 295, 308 (1997) (describing such conduct by lawyers as “a great obstacle to efficient oversight 
with limited resources”).  Nevertheless, the author also identifies “a need for restraint in exercise of 
those remedies to avoid tragic escalation arising out of misunderstanding or disability.”  Cohen, 
supra, at 308. 
 162.  See, e.g., R. GOV’G D.C. BAR XI § 3(d) (“An attorney temporarily suspended or placed 
on probation for failure to file a response to a Board order . . .  shall be reinstated and the temporary 
suspension . . . dissolved when (1) Bar Counsel notifies the Court that the attorney has responded to 
the Board’s order or (2) the Court determines that an adequate response has been filed by the 
attorney”); GA. ST. CT. R. 4-204.3(d)(3) (authorizing reinstatement where lawyer suspended for 
failure to respond in a disciplinary proceeding makes an appropriate response); see also In re 
Warnock, 525 S.E.2d 81, 82 (Ga. 2000) (lifting interim suspension for failure to file a timely answer 
when answer filed); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Lickiss, 786 N.W.2d 860, 870 n.3 
(Iowa 2010) (noting that a temporary suspension for non-response in a disciplinary proceeding is 
cured upon response and requires that the court, after appropriate notice of that fact, must 
“‘immediately reinstate the attorney’s license to practice law’”).  However, if the default is treated 
as a separate disciplinary offense, see infra text accompanying notes 168-69, mere compliance may 
be insufficient to forestall the imposition of additional discipline for noncooperation.  See, e.g., In re 
Lilly, 699 A.2d 1135 (D.C. 1997) (finding noncooperation to violate both the D.C.  Rules of 
Professional Conduct and a Bar rule and imposing a 30-day suspension conditioned upon full 
compliance with Bar Counsel’s information request). 
 163.  Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 553.  But cf. In re Coleman, 607 S.E.2d 556 (Ga. 2005) 
(giving credit, in the context of a petition for voluntary suspension, for time spent under 
noncooperation suspension). 
 164.  See, e.g., N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(e)(2) (if not cured, noncooperation suspension continues 
“until such time as the disciplinary matters before the Committee have been concluded, and until 
further order of the court”); In re Burke, 861 N.Y.S.2d 35, 38 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (suspending 
attorney until pending disciplinary matters have concluded); Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d at 554 
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While under suspension, the usual duties of notification and cessation of 
practice apply.165  Reciprocal discipline in another jurisdiction might 
also be entered,166 and the failure to cooperate may be treated as a prior 
disciplinary offense in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding.167 
That said, failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process is 
punished in many other ways than immediate suspension.  For example, 
it can be treated as another disciplinary violation to be added to those 
already being prosecuted.168  As one court commented in justifying this 
approach: 
[Noncooperation in the disciplinary process] not only show[s] blatant 
disregard for this Court’s authority, but reveal[s] how little they value 
their license to practice law. . . . Lawyers who fail to discharge these 
minimal burdens to protect their own interests cannot be expected or 
trusted to act to protect the interests of clients, the public and the legal 
profession.169 
It may also be treated as an aggravating factor when establishing the 
sanction for the underlying disciplinary charges.170  To the extent the 
(noting that “since this opinion concludes the present disciplinary action, there is no longer a need to 
‘prompt a response to the board’s inquiries,’ and the temporary suspensions [for noncooperation] 
are accordingly dismissed”).  That of course is not true if the state decides to treat noncooperation as 
a separate disciplinary offense, rather than as an interim suspension in a proceeding evaluating other 
misconduct.  See generally infra text accompanying notes 168-69. 
 165.  IOWA STATE CT. R. 34.7(3)(g)-(h) (detailing client notification requirements upon 
noncooperation suspension); VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES 13-6 G.3 (requiring notification 
of clients, opposing counsel and courts, as well as making “appropriate arrangements for the 
disposition of matters then in his or her care in conformity with the wishes of his or her clients” 
where interim suspension for failure to comply with a summons or subpoena is imposed). 
 166.  See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 635 S.E.2d 694, 695 n.4 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (noting reciprocal 
discipline had been entered for noncooperation suspension in another state). 
 167.  See, e.g., In re Hammock, 602 S.E.2d 658, 659 (Ga. 2004) (treating suspension for 
noncooperation in a previous disciplinary proceeding as prior discipline and thus an aggravating 
factor); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 759 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Iowa 2009) (same). 
 168.  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (knowing disobedience of the 
rules of a tribunal) & 8.1(b) (knowing failure to respond to a lawful demand from a disciplinary 
authority); IOWA STATE CT. R. 32:8.1(b); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 20:8.4 (h); see also In re Edwards, 990 
A.2d 501, 524-26 (D.C. 2010) (finding noncooperation in a disciplinary proceeding to violate rules 
requiring response to a lawful demand from disciplinary authorities [8.1] and prohibiting conduct 
that seriously interferes with the administration of justice [8.4(d)]); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary 
Bd. v. Hearity, 812 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Iowa 2012) (sanctioning lawyer for violating Iowa’s 
“cooperation” disciplinary rule); State v. Crawford, 827 N.W.2d 214, 235 (Neb. 2013) (imposing 
discipline, finding noncooperation to be prejudicial to the administration of justice and a violation of 
the lawyer’s oath of office).  See generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Failure to Co-operate with 
or Obey Disciplinary Authorities as Ground for Disciplining Attorney — Modern Cases, 37 
A.L.R.4th 646, § 3[a] (1985 & Cum. Supp.). 
 169.  State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Haave, 290 P.3d 747, 752 (Okla. 2012). 
 170.  See, e.g., AM. B. ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS STD. 9.22(e) 
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lack of cooperation involves a failure to answer or appear, it might be 
treated as an admission of the facts not responded to171 or as grounds for 
entering discipline by default.172 
This potential array of multiple remedies could be implemented in a 
variety of ways.  It might be left to prosecutorial discretion to determine 
which remedy or remedies best fit the situation.  Alternatively, a state 
might arrange them in an order of increasing severity, placing additional 
pressure on the respondent to cooperate in the process.  For example, in 
Ohio, the first step is notifying the respondent that, absent response to 
the complaint, the default will be certified to the Ohio Supreme Court.173  
If the failure to respond continues, the next step is interim suspension.174  
If a response is still not forthcoming, the interim suspension may be 
converted into an indefinite suspension175 or possibly disbarment.176 
As to the collateral consequences that flow from the imposition of 
(1992) (treating as an aggravating factor “bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by 
intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency”); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y 
Disciplinary Bd. v. Cunningham, 812 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Iowa 2012) (treating failure to respond to 
and cooperate with the Board’s investigation as an aggravating factor); In re Gustafson, 986 N.E.2d 
377, 379 (Mass. 2013) (noting that “failure to cooperate in the disciplinary process may be 
considered as a factor in aggravation of other misconduct”). 
 171.  See, e.g., IOWA CT. R. 36.7 (providing that “[i]f the respondent fails or refuses to file such 
answer within the time specified, the allegations of the complaint shall be considered admitted, and 
the matter shall proceed to a hearing on the issue of the appropriate sanction”); LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX, 
§ 11(E)(3) (providing that upon failure to answer a disciplinary complaint “the factual allegations 
contained within the formal charges shall be deemed admitted and proven by clear and convincing 
evidence”); MASS. R. SUP. JUD. COUNCIL 4:01 § 8(3)(a); S.C. APP. CT. R. 413(24)(a) (“Failure to 
answer the formal charges shall constitute an admission of the factual allegations.”); S.C. APP. CT. 
R. 213(24)(b) (“If the respondent should fail to appear when specifically so ordered by the hearing 
panel or the Supreme Court, the respondent shall be deemed to have admitted the factual allegations 
which were to be the subject of such appearance and to have conceded the merits of any motion or 
recommendations to be considered at such appearance.”); S.C. APP. CT. R. 213(27)(a) (“The failure 
of a party to file a brief taking exceptions to the report constitutes acceptance of the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and recommendations.”).  For cases applying these standards see Hearity, 812 
N.W.2d at 616–17 (applying Iowa’s “admission” provision); In re Pittman, 76 So. 3d 425, 431 (La. 
2011) (noting that if a “lawyer does not answer the formal charges, the factual allegations of those 
charges are deemed admitted.”); In re Hursey, 719 S.E.2d 670, 673 (S.C. 2011) (treating failure to 
answer formal charges and appear at a proceeding as an admission of the factual allegations 
contained in the formal charges).  See generally Landis, supra note 168, at § 4. 
 172.  See, e.g., OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 6a(D)–(F). 
 173.  OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 6a(A). 
 174.  Id. at § 6a(B). 
 175.  Id. at § 6a(E)(1). 
 176.  Id. at § 6a(F)(2)(a)(iii).  A system is employed in New York in which if an interim 
suspension, including one for noncooperation, has been entered, and the suspended lawyer does not 
appear or apply in writing for a hearing or reinstatement for more than six months after its entrance, 
the lawyer may be disbarred without further notice.  N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(g); see also In re Reis, 960 
N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (disbarring lawyer under this provision). 
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an interim suspension for obstructing the disciplinary process, this 
situation might appear analogous to administrative suspensions.  In both, 
the interim suspension is provided as leverage to compel compliance 
with a duty to the system.  In the administrative suspension area, I 
worried that the costs may be too great and that alternative approaches 
should be explored.177  Nevertheless, the situations differ significantly.  
In contrast to administrative suspension, failure to cooperate in the 
disciplinary process is itself a disciplinary offense.178  Further, 
noncooperation undercuts the core functioning of the disciplinary 
process.179  As such, the failures here are more than ministerial and thus 
justify the more intrusive sanction. 
VI. INTERIM SUSPENSIONS FOR PUBLIC HARM 
Several competing policies are at work when thinking about 
whether and when to impose an interim suspension pending final 
disposition on a lawyer whose conduct is the subject of a disciplinary or 
capacity inquiry.  On the one hand, the lawyer regulatory system owes a 
duty to protect the public from lawyer misconduct, misconduct that may 
well continue throughout the often lengthy disciplinary process.180  On 
the other hand, even an interim suspension is a drastic remedy.181  For 
many lawyers, their sole means of livelihood is halted.182  The inability 
of these lawyers to continue to serve their clients also can have negative 
 177.  See supra text accompanying notes 68-71. 
 178.  See supra text accompanying note 168. 
 179.  See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 827 N.W.2d 214, 238 (Neb. 2013). 
 180.  AM. BAR ASS’N CENTER FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, 2010 SURVEY ON LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS, chart V, item 21b, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/chart52010
sold.authcheckdam.pdf (reporting for many states average times from receipt of a complaint to 
imposition of a public sanction of well over a year, with several states reporting a two-year period) 
(The full report is available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/administrative/professional_responsibility/2010_sold_finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf).  See 
generally State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Haave, 290 P.3d 747, 758 (Okla. 2012) (lamenting that 
failure to seek interim suspension in a disciplinary action that took two years to conclude left “the 
lawyer and the public dangling like participles in suspension for years at a time”). 
 181.  Cf. In re Johnson, 48 P.3d 881 (Utah 2001) (recognizing the difficulties imposed by even 
a temporary suspension of a law practice). 
 182.  That is not always the case, however.  In one instance, where an interim suspension was 
entered because the lawyer was acting as a lawyer in thousands of debt collection matters across the 
United States, thereby engaging in unauthorized practice, while being subject to numerous 
consumer complaints and state attorney general challenges in the process, the court noted that the 
lawyer could still engage in some debt collection as a non-lawyer, mitigating the harm he would 
suffer from the interim suspension.  In re Boyajian, No. 06-TE-15159 (Cal. State Bar Ct. Review 
Dep’t Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-TE-15159.pdf. 
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impacts on clients and those dealing with them, such as the courts, 
regulators, and third parties.  These consequences argue for caution.183 
As one court put it: 
The harm to a lawyer that will come from the suspension of his right to 
practice law is obviously substantial.  Not only will the lawyer lose his 
clients (at least during the period of suspension), but his reputation will 
probably be damaged in a way that cannot be repaired even if the law-
yer later receives total vindication in the disciplinary process.  The 
lawyer who loses his practice may well be adversely affected in the de-
fense of criminal and disciplinary charges arising from the alleged 
misconduct, at least in his ability to afford counsel.  Moreover, a tem-
porary suspension can burden the lawyer’s clients who must seek rep-
resentation elsewhere at the risk of delay and greater expense.  Because 
of the substantial and likely harm that would arise from a temporary 
suspension that later proves to have been entered improvidently, [the 
Massachusetts rule] requires that there be a showing of a threat of fu-
ture harm that in the public interest must be guarded against by a tem-
porary suspension.184 
Nevertheless, at some point, the need to protect the public is so 
compelling that the power to impose an interim suspension in this 
context may lie in the inherent authority of the state supreme court, even 
in the absence of a rule on point.185 
In balancing the need for public protection against the costs 
suspensions entail, each state must determine the severity of the threat 
and the certainty of its occurrence necessary to support interim relief.  
The current ABA model has two points of emphasis: (1) the threat of 
harm must be “substantial,” and (2) the potential harm must be 
“serious.”186  States vary in how they treat each of these factors. 
For example, as to the likelihood of occurrence, Pennsylvania’s 
rule, at least on its face, tightens the “substantial threat” standard by 
limiting the interim suspension to instances in which the lawyer’s 
 183.  See, e.g., In re Malvin, 466 A.2d 1220, 1223 (D.C. 1983) (emphasizing “that a temporary 
suspension is an extreme measure, reserved for exceptional cases, and that the Board must therefore 
make a strong showing of ‘great public harm’ as required by the rule.  A temporary suspension 
should not be sought, and will not be granted, in a routine disciplinary case.”); Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Battistelli, 457 S.E.2d 652, 659 (W. Va. 1995) (recognizing that temporary 
suspensions of this kind should only be entered in the most extreme cases of lawyer misconduct). 
 184.  In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1161–62 (Mass. 1997). 
 185.  W. Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Ikner, 438 S.E.2d 613, 617–18 (W. Va. 
1994). 
 186.  MRLDE R. 20(A) (premising interim suspensions on a showing that the lawyer “poses a 
substantial threat of serious harm to the public”). 
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continued practice “is causing immediate or substantial public or private 
harm.”187  New Mexico tempers this somewhat, requiring a finding that 
the lawyer’s conduct “will result in a substantial probability of harm, 
loss or damage to the public.”188  Similarly, Oregon provides for interim 
suspension when disciplinary authorities can show that the lawyer’s 
continued practice “will, or is likely to, result in substantial harm to any 
person or the public at large.”189  New York seems to fall somewhere in 
between.  That state’s rule focuses on situations where continued 
practice by the lawyer is “immediately threatening the public 
interest.”190 
As to the degree of harm that must be threatened, the ABA shifted 
its stance over time on this issue.  At one point, the ABA required a 
showing that the lawyer “poses a substantial threat of irreparable harm to 
the public.”191  That standard was criticized for being unduly restrictive, 
as the “irreparable harm” language suggested the need to meet the 
standards for the issuance of a preliminary injunction,192 and was 
replaced by a need to show only “substantial threat of serious harm.”193  
Nevertheless, some states retain a version of the older model.194 
Another approach some states employ in describing the harm 
necessary to justify interim suspension, is to identify particular conduct 
 187.  PA. DISCIPL. BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 188.  N.M. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. 17-207(A)(5) (emphasis added). 
 189.  OR. BAR R. PROC. 3.1(a) (emphasis added). 
 190.  N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(1) (1997) (emphasis added).  Wyoming’s rule is similar.  WYO. 
DISCIPL. CODE § 17(a) (interim suspension triggered by a showing of “imminent threat of 
substantial harm to the public” from continued practice). 
 191.  MRLDE R. 20(A) (1989). 
 192.  MCKAY REPORT, supra note 117, at 55 (finding that the “irreparable harm” standard 
imported requirements for the granting of temporary restraining orders that were inappropriate in 
the disciplinary context).  But cf. TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.01 (providing for the entrance of an 
interim suspension through a preliminary injunction). 
 193.  MRLDE R. 20(A) (emphasis added).  This is the standard in many states.  See, e.g., N.J. 
CT. R. 1:20-11(a); OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5a(A)(1); S.C. APP. CT. R. 502(17)(b); VT. SUP. CT. 
ADMIN. ORDER NO.9, R.18A; WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND. 7.2(a)(1)(A). 
 194.  Some states still employ the “irreparable harm” standard.  See, e.g., N.D. R. LAWYER 
DISCIPL. 3.4(A)(2) (interim suspension authorized where lawyer “poses a substantial threat of 
irreparable harm to the public”); OKLA. DISCIPL. PROC. R. 6.2A (interim suspension allowed where 
the lawyer’s conduct “poses an immediate threat of substantial and irreparable public harm”); TEX. 
R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02 (interim suspension authorized for conduct that “poses a substantial threat 
of irreparable harm”); R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-518(a) (interim suspension predicated upon 
“substantial threat of irreparable harm to the public”); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC. 3.27(a) 
(interim suspension authorized where lawyer poses “substantial threat of irreparable harm to the 
public”); In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d 972, 979 (Utah 2001); cf. In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (Mass. 
1997) (noting that although the state’s interim suspension rule “does not announce that principles 
applicable to the issuance of a preliminary injunction should guide the temporary suspension issues, 
those principles are instructive”). 
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that poses a sufficient threat for future misconduct, as well as a catch-all 
category to capture substantial harms not otherwise listed.  This 
approach gives some additional guidance to lawyers about the 
consequences of their actions and to disciplinary authorities as to the 
kinds of matters worthy of special attention.  For example, Arkansas 
permits interim suspensions when the attorney has engaged in 
misappropriation, abandoned an active law practice, or poses a 
substantial threat to the public or clients.195  Pennsylvania’s rule focuses 
on situations where the lawyer “is causing immediate and substantial 
public or private harm because of the misappropriation of funds . . . or 
because of other egregious conduct, in manifest violation of the 
Disciplinary Rules or the Enforcement Rules.”196  Tennessee also 
specifically mentions misappropriation as one ground for a temporary 
suspension.197  In addition, it identifies failure to respond to a 
disciplinary complaint198 and failure to substantially comply with a 
lawyer assistance program contract, along with the catchall for any other 
conduct that “poses a threat of substantial harm to the public.”199  The 
Texas rule identifies three conditions that can satisfy its “substantial 
threat of irreparable harm” standard: (1) conduct that meets all the 
elements of a “Serious Crime,” (2) three or more acts of professional 
misconduct, or (3) “any other conduct . . .  that, if continued, will 
probably cause harm to clients or prospective clients.”200 
While most states require a significantly likely threat of a 
substantial harm, others seem to have more permissive interim 
suspension provisions.  Rhode Island, for example, authorizes its 
disciplinary counsel to seek an immediate suspension “when it is 
necessary for the public’s protection.”201  Wisconsin has an even less 
demanding standard – suspension may be entered where “it appears that 
the attorney’s continued practice of law poses a threat to the interests of 
the public and the administration of justice.”202  Note that neither the 
likelihood of the occurrence, nor the gravity of the harm is spelled out. 
Interrelated to the overall standard is the burden of proof the state 
 195.  ARK. SUP. CT. PROC.  REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 
17(E)(3)(c)(i)-(iii).  This rule also allows for the imposition of interim suspensions “[a]t the moment 
the Committee decides to initiate disbarment proceedings.” Id. at § 17(E)(3)(a). 
 196.  PA. DISCIPL. BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(a)(1). 
 197.  TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3. 
 198.  Others treat this under a separate noncooperation provision.  See supra Part V. 
 199.  TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3. 
 200.  TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02. 
 201.  R.I. R. SUP. CT. art. III, R. 5(b)(6). 
 202.  WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.21(1). 
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must meet to justify an interim suspension.  The higher the burden, the 
less likely it is that interim sanctions for threat of harm will be imposed.  
Choosing that evidentiary standard again requires a balancing of the 
need for public protection with the costs associated with imposing 
interim suspensions.  Here again we see variation across the states.  
Some states require a showing of probable cause.203  Others employ a 
preponderance of the evidence standard,204 while others insist upon clear 
and convincing evidence.205 
It is unclear whether these variations across the states make a 
difference in fact.  Perhaps the states really are trying to finely hone the 
balance between the need for public protection and the significant 
burden suspensions cause.  The language chosen and the burden of proof 
applied set the mood point for how regular or rare interim suspensions 
should be.  Nevertheless, the reality of when to seek and when to impose 
interim suspensions may be far more visceral.  The case law seldom 
reflects a close parsing of the language of the standards or the burden of 
proof involved. 
The power to impose interim suspensions for threat of harm, at 
whatever likelihood of harm and seriousness of harm standards are 
chosen, is not unbounded.  Two limitations attach, although one may be 
largely semantic. 
First, the device is not a blanket authorization to seek out and 
curtail lawyer misconduct.  Rather it is but an interim step available in 
the context of an ongoing disciplinary investigation or proceeding,206 or 
 203.  ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a); WYO. DISCIPL. CODE § 17(b).  While disciplinary authorities in 
Wyoming need only show there is probable cause to believe the lawyer poses a sufficient threat, the 
lawyer when seeking to dissolve the interim suspension must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that she no longer poses such a threat.  WYO. DISCIPL. CODE § 17(d). 
 204.  TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02; cf. In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Mass. 1997) 
(requiring for an interim suspension a preponderance of the evidence standard showing of a 
violation of a disciplinary rule and that “on a balance of the harms and consideration of the public 
interest, the lawyer poses a threat of substantial harm to present or future clients or in other 
respects”). 
  205.  R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-517(b) (providing that unlike most disciplinary matters in 
Utah in which violations must be established by a preponderance of the evidence, motions for 
interim suspension must be established by clear and convincing evidence); In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d 
972, 979 (Utah 2001) (applying the Utah rule then in force); David, supra note 149, at 356-57 
(arguing for a clear and convincing evidence standard given the severe nature of the sanction and a 
desire to minimize erroneous determinations of fault).  But see In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d at 1157 
(rejecting the clear and convincing evidence requirement). 
 206.  See MRLDE R. 20 (allowing interim suspension predicated upon sufficient evidence that 
the lawyer has violated a disciplinary rule and poses a substantial threat to the public “pending final 
disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the conduct causing the harm”); accord 
IOWA CT. R. 35.4; MO. SUP. CT. R. 5.24; N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11; N.D. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. 3.4(A)(1); 
OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5a(A)(1); R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-518; W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. 
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other event.207  It is because of this that the interim suspension typically 
ceases when the full disciplinary proceeding is concluded208 and the time 
served may be credited toward any final suspension imposed.209 
The second limitation is the object of the threat.  While it may be 
largely semantic, state rules vary as to who or what must be threatened 
with the requisite harm to warrant an interim suspension.  Concerns are 
variously expressed for threat of harm to prospective clients,210 
clients,211 an attorney,212 any person,213 the public,214 the public 
PROC. 3.27; In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Mass. 1997); see also N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(1) 
(allowing interim suspension for public harm with respect to “an attorney who is the subject of an 
investigation, or of charges by the Departmental Disciplinary Committee of professional 
misconduct, or who is the subject of a disciplinary proceeding pending in this court against whom a 
petition has been filed pursuant to this section, or upon whom a notice has been served pursuant to 
section 603.3(b) of this Part”). 
 207.  While most states tie interim suspensions to disciplinary investigations or proceedings, 
some are more expansive.  New Mexico, for example, requires that the lawyer be under 
investigation by disciplinary counsel “for an alleged violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
or a violation of a court rule, statute or other law,” have filed against him “formal disciplinary 
charges,” or a “criminal complaint, information or indictment”).  N.M. R. GOV’G BAR DISCIPL. 17-
207(A)(5); see also CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42 (providing that either a pending disciplinary 
proceeding or an overdraft notification suffices as the context in which an interim suspension may 
be sought). 
 208.  In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d 972, 973 n.1 (Utah 2001) (noting that interim suspension is a 
temporary suspension “pending a final determination of whether permanent discipline is 
necessary”); see, e.g., IOWA CT. R. 35.4(2) (providing that court may enter order immediately 
suspending attorney pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding predicated upon the 
conduct posing a substantial threat of serious harm to the public); N.D. ST. CT. R. 3.4(B) (attorney 
may be suspended “pending final disposition of the proceeding predicated upon the conduct causing 
the harm”); S.C. APP. CT. R. 413 § 17(b) (“Upon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that a 
lawyer poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or to the administration of justice, the 
Supreme Court may suspend the lawyer . . . pending a final determination in any proceeding under 
these rules.”); R. GOV’G UTAH ST. B. R. 14-518(b) (“the district court may enter an order 
immediately suspending the respondent pending final disposition of a disciplinary proceeding 
predicated upon the conduct causing the harm”). 
 209.  See, e.g., In re Pittman, 76 So. 3d 425, 432 n.3 (La. 2011) (noting that the court has 
“historically chosen to exercise [its] discretion to make suspensions run retroactive to the date of 
prior interim suspensions” and applying that practice here); In re Durante, 926 N.Y.S.2d 642, 646 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (giving credit for time served on interim suspension toward full disciplinary 
suspension in a case involving multiple violations in handling client funds); In re Edin, 697 N.W.2d 
727, 731 (N.D. 2005) (concluding that term of suspension for underlying misconduct should begin 
date interim suspension ordered); In re Bentley, 714 S.E.2d 279, 279 (S.C. 2011) (ordering that 
definite suspension of two years for misconduct be treated as retroactive to the date of respondent’s 
interim suspension). 
 210.  TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 2.14(B). 
 211.  MRLDE R. 20 cmt.; N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(a); TEXAS R. DISCIPL. PROC. 2.14(B). 
 212.  N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(a). 
 213.  OR. BAR R. 3.1(a). 
 214.  MRLDE R. 20 cmt.: ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a); N.J. CT. R. 1:20-11(a); OHIO GOV. BAR R. 
V § 5a(A)(1); OR. BAR R. 3.1(a); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3; WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND. 
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interest,215 the legal profession,216 or the administration of justice.217  
States often string several of these together.218 
While the choice may signify a difference in the scope of the 
interim suspension rule,219 the larger the group included, the greater the 
instances in which interim suspensions are warranted, that is not readily 
apparent from a review of the case law. One exception to that general 
statement is In re Reiner’s Case.220  In that case, the Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire construed a New Hampshire rule that allows for the 
imposition of interim suspensions pending the resolution of criminal 
charges when “it is both necessary for the protection of the public and 
for the preservation of the integrity of the legal profession.”221  Insisting 
that both prongs must be met, the court denied an interim suspension of 
a lawyer indicted for promoting prostitution and money laundering.222  
The court agreed that an interim suspension might be necessary to 
preserve the integrity of the profession, but determined that it was not 
needed to protect the public given that the alleged criminal actions did 
not involve misconduct directed toward clients.223 
Regardless of the exact standard employed, the statutes and case 
law provide guidance on the types of misconduct that have been found to 
warrant interim suspension.224  Some forms of conduct, in and of 
themselves, seem particularly likely to be repeated and hence often raise 
a substantial risk of public harm.225  High among them is 
misappropriation226 or admitted failure to pay money owed to a client,227 
7.2(a)(1)(A); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC.  3.27(a). 
 215.  N.Y. CT. R. § 603.4(e)(1). 
 216.  ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a). 
 217.  MRLDE R. 20 cmt.; ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 61(a); S.C. APP. CT. R. 502(17)(b). 
 218.  See generally supra notes 210-17 and the rules cited therein in multiple footnotes. 
 219.  For example, the comment to Rule 20 of the MRLDE indicates that interim suspensions 
are appropriate for misconduct that “poses such an immediate threat to the public and the 
administration of justice that the lawyer should be suspended immediately,” but is “also appropriate 
when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is causing or is likely to cause serious injury to a client or the 
public” MRLDE R. 20 cmt.  It is unclear what conduct falls in one category, but not the other. 
 220.  In re Reiner’s Case, 883 A.2d 315 (N.H. 2005). 
 221.  Id. at 318 (citing N.H. SUP. CT. R. 37(16)(f)). 
 222.  Id. at 319. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Some states treat conviction of a serious crime under the threat of public harm provision.  
Others treat it as a separate category.  I have chosen to treat it as a separate category.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 134-44. 
 225.  Even here, however, a pattern of misconduct is more likely to be pursued than an isolated 
incident, as the latter may not suggest a future threat. 
 226.  MRLDE R. 20 cmt. (conversion of trust funds warrants interim suspension); accord ARK. 
SUP. CT. PROC. REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF ATT’Y AT LAW § 17(E)(3)(c)(i); PA. DISCIPL. 
BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(a)(1); TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3;  see, e.g., In re Schachter, 952 N.Y.S.2d 
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such as failure to pay fee arbitration awards.228  Disappearance and/or 
abandonment of law practice also pose an obvious threat.229 
Capacity issues also deserve a close look.  Most states have 
provisions to suspend, or transfer to inactive status, a lawyer suffering 
from a disability that significantly impairs the lawyer’s capacity to 
practice.230  Even with these provisions in place, however, swifter action 
may be necessary if the lawyer’s continued practice poses a substantial 
and immediate threat to the public.  Where this is the case, an interim 
suspension may be warranted.231 
Arrest or indictment for criminal conduct also is a common trigger 
for interim suspensions. In some states, a separate rule governs this 
situation.232  In others, the conduct underlying the arrest or indictment 
may trigger a public harm suspension.233  The suspension is not 
168, 169 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); In re Reis, 942 N.Y.S.2d 101, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); In re 
Myers, No. 59866, 2012 WL 652756 (Nev. Feb. 24, 2012).  At least in New York such conduct 
appears to automatically constitute an immediate threat to the public.  See, e.g., In re Riley, 957 
N.Y.S.2d 290 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (imposing public harm suspension despite argument there was 
no threat of pubic harm where only a single act of misappropriation, which was repaid by the 
attorney, was involved); cf. In re Gibson, 960 N.Y.S.2d 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (rejecting claim 
of no immediate threat of public harm despite argument that the misappropriations had been repaid, 
no client complaints had been made, and the misconduct was two-years old and had not recurred).  
Other states differ.  See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Comm. Reviewing Comm. v. Hillman, 2000 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2541 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 2000) (denying interim public harm 
suspension where respondent admitted to three instances of misconduct involving the same client, 
including two involving misappropriation); cf. Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Discipl. Bd. v. Powell, 830 
N.W.2d 355, 356 (Iowa 2013) (terminating interim suspension for trust account errors upon a 
showing that the errors were the result of “sloppy procedures and oversight,” substantial measures 
had been adopted to avoid these problems, and the trust account shortage had been rectified). 
 227.  The New York rule specifically identifies this conduct as immediately threatening the 
public interest thus warranting an interim suspension.  N.Y. CT. R. 603.4(e)(iv); see In re Bloodsaw, 
926 N.Y.S.2d 490, 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (applying this standard). 
 228.  2010 NEW JERSEY STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 17 (noting that 
21 percent of the cases warranting “emergent discipline” (interim suspension or conditions) 
involved non-payment of fee arbitration awards). 
 229.  MRLDE R. 20 cmt. (abandonment of practice warrants interim suspension); accord ARK. 
SUP. CT. PROC. REGULATING PROF’L CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 17(E)(3)(c)(ii); W. Va. 
State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Ikner, 438 S.E.2d 613 (W. Va. 1994). 
 230.  See, e.g., MRLDE R. 23 (providing for transfer to inactive disability status in these 
circumstances). 
 231.  See, e.g., MRLDE R. 20(A); OKLA. R. GOV’G DISCIPL. PROC. 6.2(A); R.  GOV’G UTAH 
STATE BAR 14-518(a); VT. R. SUP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER NO. 9, R. 18A; W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIP. 
PROC. 3.27(a).  In Washington, if a hearing to determine whether a transfer to inactive disability 
status has been ordered, disciplinary authorities “must petition the Supreme Court” for an interim 
suspension.  WASH. R. ENF. LAWYER COND. 8.2(d). 
 232.  See supra text accompanying notes 146. 
 233.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Hanson, No. CV054017144, 2006 WL 2349162 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. July 28, 2006); In re Shepherd, 990 So. 2d 734, 735 (La. 2008) (Johnson, J., dissenting) 
(noting two cases, In re Dillon, 918 So. 2d 466 (La. 2006), and In re Hammond, 917 So. 2d 433 
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automatic, however; the requisite threat of harm to the public must be 
shown.234 
In other instances, it is the repeated nature of the misconduct or the 
extent of the misconduct in question that justifies the interim 
suspension.235  For example, in one case, substantial misconduct in the 
litigation process, such as violating confidentiality orders and suggesting 
that a subordinate alter documents to create claims of work product, was 
so extensive as to warrant interim suspension.236  Another court found 
wide-spread unauthorized practice of law in a nationwide debt collection 
practice sufficiently repeated and substantial to justify an interim 
(La. 2005) — both involving sexual misconduct — where each attorney received an interim 
suspension following an indictment because of the threat of public harm in continuing to allow the 
attorney to practice); In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154 (Mass. 1997); Burleigh v. State Bar of Nev., 643 
P.2d 1201 (Nev. 1982); ); In re Wolff, 767 N.W.2d 170, 170–71 (N.D. 2009). 
 234.  See, e.g., Hanson, No. CV054017144, 2006 WL 2349162, at *4 (“The problem with 
creating a per se rule that an arrest and pending charges against a criminal defense lawyer should 
result in an automatic interim suspension is that it simply sweeps too broadly and ignores the risk 
faced by lawyers of unfounded arrests and charges by disgruntled and/or vindictive clients or 
opponents, notwithstanding the probable cause requirement for an arrest.  That is why a case by 
case rather than a per se rule makes sense.”); cf. In re Clark, 25 So. 3d 728, 730 (La. 2009) (lawyer 
“arrested and charged with possession with intent to distribute marijuana, distribution of marijuana, 
possession of cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia,” although all in small amounts, was 
placed on interim suspension for his threat of harm; based on subsequent evaluation of his ability to 
handle the practice, interim suspension was dissolved). 
 235.  See, e.g., MRLDE R. 20 cmt.  (noting that a pattern of misconduct may warrant interim 
suspension); TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.02 (providing that a lawyer who has committed three or 
more acts of professional misconduct conclusively establishes that the attorney poses a substantial 
threat of irreparable harm warranting interim suspension); see also In re Cyrus, 241 P.3d 890 
(Alaska 2010) (repeated failure to communicate with clients and attend court hearings prompting 
numerous complaints from judges before whom he was appearing, coupled with failure to respond 
to the disciplinary charges, warranted interim suspension on harm to the public grounds); In re 
Saghir, 632 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (receipt of additional complaints while interim 
suspension proceeding was pending helped reinforce concern of danger to others); In re Romano, 
660 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (repeatedly giving female clients inappropriate intimate 
physical examinations in cases where they alleged physical injury warranted interim suspension); 
Office of Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Nichols, 570 S.E.2d 577 (W. Va. 2002) (finding that 
multiple allegations that lawyer agreed to file lawsuits for clients, failed to do so, and then lied to 
clients that the suits had been filed warranted interim suspension); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Battistelli, 457 S.E.2d 652, 660 (W. Va. 1995) (finding pattern of deceitful conduct and repeated 
negotiation of inappropriate loans from clients in violation of Rule 1.8(a) justified interim 
suspension); In re Woodruff, 2013 MP 1, 16 (N. Mar. I. Feb. 1, 2013) (premising interim 
suspension on the fact that eleven complaints had been filed against Woodruff “ranging from lying 
about filing a criminal appeal to having several cases dismissed with prejudice due to lack of 
diligence . . . suggest[ing] that Woodruff routinely fails to follow through regarding cases he takes” 
and “declin[ing] to risk a similar fate for current and future clients”). 
 236.  In re Peters, 543 F. Supp. 2d 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying on 109-page district court 
sanction order imposing more than 24 separate reprimands or sanctions to justify interim 
suspension), final suspension order rev’d and remanded, 642 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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suspension.237 
Special concern also arises when particularly vulnerable clients 
have been harmed by the lawyer.238  Both the predatory aspect of the 
conduct and fear for other vulnerable clients seem to drive interim 
suspensions here. 
It is important to note that interim suspension is warranted 
regardless of whether the lawyer appreciates the wrongfulness of his 
actions.239  The focus is on protecting the public from harm, not the 
motivation of the lawyer in engaging in the conduct.240  In fact, failure to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of the conduct may suggest that the 
misconduct is likely to be repeated absent an interim suspension.241 
At first look, there appear to be substantial reasons to allow for 
interim suspensions to protect against public harm, but that does not end 
the inquiry.  An interim suspension regime, in this context, is more 
justified if disciplinary counsel and the courts are given sufficient 
discretion in determining whether to seek interim suspensions and 
sufficient latitude to consider other remedies to protect the public from 
harm. 
The first question is how much discretion should be accorded to 
disciplinary authorities in deciding whether to seek interim suspension 
and the adjudicatory body in whether to impose it.  Some statutes appear 
 237.  In re Boyajian, No. 06-TE-15159 (Cal  State Bar Ct. Review Dep’t Apr. 15, 2008), 
available at http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-TE-15159.pdf (finding that lawyer’s use of 
California law license and California law firms as leverage in conducting nationwide debt-collection 
activities probably constituted unauthorized practice, thereby warranting interim suspension 
pending completion of the disciplinary process). 
 238.  See, e.g., In re Saghir, 632 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (imposing interim 
suspension on lawyer who used a runner to obtain clients in prison whose cases she then neglected 
and with whom she failed to communicate, in part because “Respondent’s misconduct is aimed at 
particularly vulnerable clients in the form of inmates who are not sophisticated about the legal 
system, and who may maintain unrealistic hopes about post-conviction relief”). 
 239.  In re Romano, 660 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (finding that continued practice 
of performing improper physical examinations of female clients after already having been 
temporarily suspended for the practice, and having testified that he had given up that practice, 
warranted an additional temporary suspension; noting that “even if respondent’s motives were 
entirely sincere, his admitted inability to comprehend the problem with his actions establishes that 
he poses an immediate threat to the public interest”); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Battistelli, 
457 S.E.2d 652, 661 (W. Va. 1995) (noting, in imposing interim suspension, that lawyer refused to 
recognize the wrongfulness of engaging in unfair loan transactions with his clients and continued to 
do so even after being warned by disciplinary counsel that his conduct violated Rule 1.8(a)). 
 240.  At least one court has held that the intent of the lawyer to violate the disciplinary rules is 
not necessary to be shown, unless that is an element of the underlying offense.  In re Trujillo, 24 
P.3d 972 (Utah 2001). 
 241.  In re Peters, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 329 (predicating interim suspension on extensive 
litigation misconduct and “the danger of recurrence demonstrated by respondent’s lack of 
appreciation of the wrongfulness of her misconduct”). 
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to limit the discretion of disciplinary counsel in determining whether to 
seek interim suspension.242  At least one judge has excoriated the bar for 
working out other accommodations, rather than following the interim 
suspension rule, where the provision for interim suspension for 
conviction of a crime was involved.243  The concern was that such acts 
deprived the court of its rightful authority to determine the suspension 
issue.244  To my mind, this criticism goes too far, at least if it applies to 
public harm suspensions.  Given the limited resources available to 
disciplinary counsel, pursuing possible interim suspension for public 
harm must be balanced against other resource needs.  Proving 
misconduct twice, first for an interim suspension and then for a final 
disposition, may not be warranted if the need for a suspension is not 
clear cut.  One’s stance on this issue may explain some of the divergence 
across the states in terms of how often interim suspensions for public 
harm are imposed.245 
To the extent the decision to seek an interim suspension is 
discretionary,246 disciplinary counsel weigh many factors in deciding 
whether or not to pursue an interim suspension.  Certainly an appraisal 
of the true likelihood of future public harm is at the top, but disciplinary 
counsel also may consider seeking an interim suspension for the indirect 
leverage it provides.  For example, it may spur cooperation.  
Disciplinary counsel may make it known that cooperation in the 
investigation of the underlying grievance and voluntary acceptance of 
certain conditions on practice, such as agreeing to be supervised by a 
 242.  MRLDE R. 20(A) (providing that upon receipt of sufficient evidence to meet the interim 
suspension standard, disciplinary counsel “shall” file for an interim suspension); accord CONN. 
PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42; R. GOV’G UTAH STATE BAR 14-518(a); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. 
PROC. 3.27(a); see also Donald R.  Lundberg, Two Case Studies in the Exercise of Discretion in 
Lawyer Discipline Systems, 2009 J. PROF. LAW. 107, 117 (noting that under the MRLDE the 
disciplinary counsel “is seemingly required . . .  to seek emergency interim suspension” when the 
applicable standard is met, whereas in some states this is a discretionary call). 
 243.  State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Conrady, 275 P.3d 133, 140 (Okla. 2012) (Kauger, J., 
concurring). 
 244.  Id. at 143. 
 245.  In 2010, 541 suspensions for risk of harm or criminal conviction were imposed 
nationwide, with an average of eleven and a mean of four.  AM.  BAR ASS’N, 2010 SURVEY ON 
LAWYER DISCIPLINARY SYSTEMS, chart II, clm. 10d., http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/chart22010sold.authcheckdam.pdf (Lawyers Interimly 
Suspended (for Risk of Harm or Criminal Conviction)) (The full report is available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2010_sold
_finalreport.authcheckdam.pdf).  California led the jurisdictions with 161.  Id.  Next highest was the 
District of Columbia with 58.  Id.  Thirty-three states had fewer than ten, with eight reporting zero.  
Id.  The following reported “n/a:” Georgia, New Mexico, and Virginia.  Id. 
 246.  See supra text accompanying notes 242-45. 
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monitor, might get disciplinary counsel to forgo pushing for a public 
harm suspension on the theory that such cooperation lessens the 
likelihood of the lawyer engaging in further misconduct during the 
investigation and hence reduces the risk of harm to the public.247  For 
others, the threat of an interim suspension may lessen the desire of the 
lawyer to prolong the disciplinary process in order to continue to 
practice law for as long as possible.  The potential swift entrance of an 
interim suspension may spur resignations or acquiescence in disbarment 
where the lawyer’s misconduct is serious and clear.248 
As for the court considering imposing an interim suspension for 
public harm, discretion is likely to lie.249  The court has the ultimate 
authority to regulate the bar250 and needs some freedom in doing so, 
consistent with an even-handed approach to the application of the 
standards.  This is reinforced by the idea that the court may decide, in a 
particular case, to pursue alternative measures to limit harm, rather than 
use interim suspension as the sole vehicle for doing so.251 
In exercising this discretion, the courts have to balance the harms 
that accrue from imposing interim suspensions with the public interest in 
preventing future harm.252  While most opinions do not unpack the 
factors considered in this weighing, a few do.  The Utah Supreme 
Court’s opinion, in In re Trujillo, provides as example.  The court 
 247.  Alternatively, it may frighten some respondents into obtaining counsel in the disciplinary 
matter who may, in turn, help restrain the lawyer from causing additional harm. 
 248.  Tips for Bar Counsel, 10 LAW. MAN. ON PROF CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 11, at D15 
(Current Reports, June 29, 1994) (reporting the comments of an Illinois disciplinary official noting 
this fact and that it is less expensive than going through a full disciplinary proceeding). 
  Even if the lawyer is unwilling to give up her license, the threat of interim suspension may 
lead to increased consents to discipline.  In this regard, interim suspensions may be seen as 
analogous to pre-trial detention; the individual is subject to restraint (loss of a right to practice; loss 
of freedom) pending a final resolution of the underlying violation alleged.  It has been widely 
recognized, in the criminal law context, that this gives substantial leverage for prosecutors to secure 
plea bargains in exchange for release from restraint.  See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside 
the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2493 n.116 (2004).  The same may be true in the 
interim suspension context.  A lawyer may be more likely to enter into a consent to discipline 
arrangement to dissipate the effect of the interim suspension, particularly if no credit will be given 
the time under interim suspension when imposing a final disciplinary sanction.  Agreeing to 
discipline now may lessen the total time a suspension will be in place. 
 249.  See, e.g., CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42 (court “may” order interim suspension if it finds 
lawyer poses substantial threat of irreparable harm); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.21(1) (court “may” 
suspend where it “appears” lawyer may pose a threat to the public or the administration of justice). 
 250.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §1 cmt. c (2000) (noting 
that in most states the courts have the inherent power to regulate lawyers and that in many states 
that power is exclusive). 
 251.  See infra text accompanying notes 259-64. 
 252.  In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (Mass. 1997). 
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articulated the following factors to consider in the weighing: 
(1) whether the public will suffer irreparable harm unless the order of 
interim suspension issues, (2) whether the threatened injury to the pub-
lic outweighs whatever damage the proposed order may cause the at-
torney temporarily suspended from the practice of law,253 (3) whether 
the proposed order, if issued, would be adverse to the public interest, 
and (4) whether there is a substantial likelihood, based on all the avail-
able evidence, that a significant sanction will be imposed on the attor-
ney at the conclusion of any pending disciplinary proceedings.254 
When weighing these factors, the costs interim suspensions pose 
must be kept in mind.  As stated before, a suspension requires the lawyer 
 253.  Applying this factor, where the lawyer has alternative means of financial support, the 
weight given the lawyer’s interest will lessen.  See, e.g., In re Boyajian, No. 06-TE-15159, ¶ 106 
(Cal. State Bar Ct. Review Dep’t Apr. 15, 2008), available at 
http://members.calbar.ca.gov/courtDocs/06-TE-15159.pdf.  The potential length of the interim 
period of suspension before a final determination is reached might also be considered.  Some states 
require that if an interim suspension is entered, the state must prosecute the underlying grievance in 
a timely or expedited manner.  See, e.g., OR. BAR R. PROC. 3.1(h)(i) (requiring accelerated 
proceedings following temporary suspension); WIS. SUP. CT. R. 22.21(3), (4) (setting expedited time 
limits for filing a disciplinary complaint and the referee’s report on it where lawyer is under 
temporary suspension for threat of harm); see also In re Ellis, 680 N.E.2d at 1160 (noting that 
formal disciplinary hearings “must be instituted within a reasonable time” after temporary 
suspension entered); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Battistelli, 457 S.E.2d 652, 659 (W. Va. 
1995) (requiring disciplinary counsel to expedite the resolution of the charges against the lawyer 
and move to conclude the matter within 90 days after the interim suspension becomes effective); In 
re Woodruff, 2013 MP 1, 18 (N. Mar. I. Feb. 1, 2013) (requiring expedited resolution of 
disciplinary action since interim suspension entered).  If the respondent fails to cooperate or 
interferes with the formal proceeding, however, the amount of time that will be deemed 
“reasonable” may increase.  Cf. In re Abrams, 767 N.E.2d 15, 19–20 (Mass. 2002) (finding six-
month delay in the institution of proceedings reasonable given respondents failure to turn over 
relevant documents or to follow the requirements of the interim suspension order).  Other states 
place a burden on the respondent to request expedited treatment.  See, e.g., OKLA. STATE DISCIPL. 
PROC. R. 6.2A (4); PA. DISCIPL. BD. R. & PROC. § 91.151(f)(1). 
 254.  In re Trujillo, 24 P.3d 972, 979 (Utah 2001); cf. Order of Temporary Suspension and 
Referral to Disciplinary Board at 38, In re Whittemore, No. 64154 (Nev. Oct. 8, 2013) (order 
denying petition for reinstatement) (majority and dissent applying Trujillo factors in considering 
petition for reinstatement from an interim felony suspension, but disagreeing on how the factors 
should be applied).  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals articulated a similar standard in In 
re Malvin, taking into account: 
(1) whether the attorney is causing irreparable public harm by misappropriating client 
funds to his own use, or by other means, (2) whether there is a substantial likelihood, 
based on all the available evidence, including affidavits, that a significant sanction will 
be imposed on the attorney at the conclusion of any pending disciplinary proceedings, 
(3) whether the balance of injuries, as between attorney and clients, favors a temporary 
suspension, and (4) whether the public interest would be served by a temporary suspen-
sion.” 
In re Malvin, 466 A.2d 1220, 1223 (D.C. 1983); accord In re Woodruff, 2013 MP 1, 16 (N. Mar. I. 
Feb. 1, 2013) (articulating a similar standard citing, inter alia, Trujillo and Malvin). 
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to cease practice.  This not only threatens a lawyer’s livelihood, but 
imposes costs upon the lawyer’s clients to find new counsel, and on 
courts and other parties who must suffer the delay this shift in counsel 
entails.  Indirect consequences are imposed upon the lawyer, as well, to 
the extent the interim suspension triggers reciprocal suspensions in other 
jurisdictions,255 is treated as a prior disciplinary offense in a subsequent 
disciplinary proceeding,256 or has a negative effect on the lawyer’s 
malpractice insurance.257  There are also consequences on a personal 
level.  The suspension stigmatizes the lawyer, affecting reputation and 
relationships, as well as the well-being of the lawyer’s family members 
who have to cope with the situation. 
Those factors must be balanced against the court’s appraisal of the 
degree to which an interim suspension is necessary to protect the public.  
In addition, the court also may consider whether imposition of an interim 
suspension is necessary to send a message to the public and the 
profession that certain misconduct will have immediate negative 
consequences for those who commit it.258 
The availability of alternatives that may adequately protect the 
public while minimizing the social costs that flow from entrance of an 
interim suspension also should be considered.259  Given the 
 255.  See, e.g., HAW. R. SUP. CT. 2.15(a)(4) (applying reciprocal discipline to interim 
suspensions); In re Nalick, 50 So. 3d 149 (La. 2010) (imposing reciprocal discipline for a public 
harm based interim suspension); In re Pesante, 930 N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (same). 
 256.  Even if a jurisdiction decides to treat a public harm interim suspension as a prior 
disciplinary offense, an aggravating factor, in subsequent disciplinary cases, such suspensions 
should not be treated as a prior disciplinary offense when deciding the ultimate sanction in the very 
proceeding in which it was entered.  See, e.g., Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Powell, 830 
N.W.2d 355, 359 (Iowa 2013) (noting that “prior discipline is not an aggravating factor when it is 
intertwined in the current case.  . . .  Moreover, an interim suspension for conduct involved in a case 
can be considered as a mitigating factor in determining the length and adequacy of a suspension as a 
sanction in the case.”).  But see In re R.A.H., 684 S.E.2d 631, 632 (Ga. 2009) (treating as prior 
discipline an interim suspension entered in the case being considered). 
 257.  In Texas, for example, if after an interim suspension the respondent is found not to have 
committed any professional misconduct, the interim suspension “may not be deemed a sanction for 
purposes of insurance applications or any other purpose.” TEX. R. DISCIPL. PROC. 14.01.  The 
implication is that if professional misconduct is ultimately found, the interim suspension could be 
deemed a sanction for insurance purposes. 
 258.  The ability to send such a message turns, in part, on how much detail is provided in the 
court decision and order imposing the suspension.  In many states that amounts to little more than a 
pro forma statement that the standard for interim suspension has been met and it is therefore so 
ordered.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Rohe, 86 So. 3d 1115 (Fla. 2012), as modified (Apr. 2, 2012); In re 
Gilmore, Jr., 88 So. 3d 441 (La. 2012); In re Iler, 210 N.J. 121 (2012); Cleveland Metro. Bar Ass’n 
Certified Grievance Comm. v. Lemieux, 958 N.E.2d 962 (Ohio 2011); In re Newton, 722 S.E.2d 
800 (S.C. 2012); Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility, Wyo. State Bar v. Shreve, 269 P.3d 431 (Wyo. 2012). 
 259.  See, e.g., Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Macneill, No. CV 980585852, 1999 Conn. 
Super. LEXIS 1219, at *8–9 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 11, 1999) (finding that respondent did pose “a 
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consequences of interim suspensions, courts often are provided the 
option of employing other sanctions to protect the public.260  If the 
misconduct being investigated involves mismanagement of a trust 
account, for example, a financial monitor might be ordered in lieu of the 
temporary suspension.261  If the lawyer’s misconduct stems from poor 
law office management, a trustee might be appointed to oversee the 
office.262  If concerns flow from substance abuse issues, deferral to the 
state’s lawyers assistance program and a monitored course of treatment 
might be sufficient.263 
In considering these options, two principal considerations lie.  The 
first is attempting to accurately assess whether the alternative control is 
likely to be successful.  This will turn on such factors as the severity of 
the alleged disciplinary violation, the attitude shown by the respondent 
during the investigation and related proceedings, and the success rate of 
substantial threat of irreparable harm to his clients or to prospective clients,” but that “less 
draconian measures” were called for since an interim suspension “would severely and 
indeterminately punish him before a full hearing is had on the merits”).  That said, since this is an 
exercise of discretion, there is no requirement to impose the “least restrictive sanction available.” 
See, e.g., In re Abrams, 767 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Mass. 2002) (rejecting that as a limitation in upholding 
the imposition of an interim suspension as an exercise of discretion). 
 260.  MRLDE R. 20(B) (providing that the court may impose an interim suspension or “order 
such other action as it deems appropriate”); accord MASS. PRACTICE BOOK § 2-42(b); N.J. CT. R. 
1:20-11(c); OHIO GOV. BAR R. V § 5a(B); W. VA. R. LAWYER DISCIPL. PROC. 3.27(c).  South 
Dakota provides a non-exclusive list of optional restrictions or conditions that include: “requiring 
the attorney to provide proof of professional negligence insurance or the posting of a fidelity bond.” 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-19-35.1 (2011).  I have found only sporadic figures on how often these 
alternatives are implemented.  See, e.g., 2010 NEW JERSEY STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE 
SYSTEM REPORT 17 (noting that license restrictions in lieu of interim suspension were employed in 
a few cases most years). 
 261.  See, e.g., TENN. SUP. CT. R. 9 § 4.3 (recognizing temporary probation as an alternative to 
temporary suspension, and that restrictions of trust account access may be part of a temporary 
probation); 2010 NEW JERSEY STATE OF THE ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE SYSTEM REPORT 16 (noting the 
option to impose conditions rather than ordering an interim suspension and that that might include 
“oversight by a proctor of the attorney and/or the trust account”); Actions from the Board of 
Professional Responsibility, TENN. B. J., Dec. 2000, at 9 (describing a Tennessee case in which a 
temporary suspension was dissolved subject to conditions, including the appointment of a financial 
monitor to review and report to disciplinary authorities on a monthly basis). 
 262.  Cf. Macneill, No. CV 980585852, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1219, at *9 (denying 
request for interim suspension and imposing other requirements including the filing of quarterly 
reports of the lawyer’s caseload status and working under the supervision of a court-appointed 
monitor); In re Hirschfeld, 960 P.2d 640, 641-42 (Ariz. 1998) (faced with the situation in which a 
lawyer, subject to sizeable monetary sanction for misconduct in a domestic relations proceeding, 
subsequently failed to appear at various show cause hearings and fled the jurisdiction leaving some 
clients unrepresented, the Arizona Supreme Court denied interim suspension but placed the lawyer 
on probation under the supervision of a practice monitor pending the bar’s final determination of the 
charges; probation subsequently lifted and an interim suspension imposed). 
 263.  In re O’Brien, No. 59215, 2012 WL 988056 (Nev. Mar. 21, 2012) (ordering counseling, 
in lieu of an interim suspension, of lawyer who self-reported two DUI convictions). 
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the option when used in the past. 
The second is a resource consideration.264  Are there lawyers in the 
jurisdiction willing to play the monitor function?  Are they trained to do 
so?  Will they have the time to provide the oversight needed? If there are 
not, should the court create a cadre of officials within the disciplinary 
process who are trained in these roles? 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have attempted to describe and analyze the world of 
administrative and interim suspensions.  That overview reveals that 
suspensions are used in a variety of settings, with different justifications 
and somewhat different consequences depending on the context 
involved.  Given the substantial costs such suspensions impose, I argue 
for tempering those consequences in certain settings, such as pure 
administrative suspensions, and for employing less disruptive sanctions 
wherever possible. 
What remains, and is the next step for this project, is to explore 
how the authorities make decisions about when to use these devices 
where they have discretion as to how to proceed.  Take, for example, 
public harm suspensions.  Is the low frequency of interim suspension for 
public harm a product of their being few cases where the public is at 
risk, or a conscious decision to forgo this remedy?  If disciplinary 
authorities are reluctant to seek interim suspensions, even though there is 
a sufficient threat of public harm, what are the reasons behind that 
choice?  Are there structural improvements one could make in the 
mechanics of seeking interim suspensions, the consequences of them, or 
the range of alternatives that might alter current choices?  These and 
other questions await further exploration. 
 
 264.  The resource issue seems substantial on first blush, but may well be overstated.  If an 
interim suspension is ordered, a court may appoint another to handle the practice of the suspended 
lawyer for a period of time. See, e.g., In re Jones, 739 S.E.2d 218 (S.C. 2013) (appointing lawyer to 
assume duties with respect to interimly suspended lawyer’s practice, applying S.C. APP. CT. R. 
413(31)).  Appointing some sort of practice monitor, in lieu of an interim suspension, might actually 
place fewer burdens on the system and the appointed lawyer. 
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